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INTRODUCTION
On the wall of the Legacy Museum in Montgomery, Alabama, the visitor’s
eye is drawn to a striking photograph of black men who appear to be sleeping—or
trying to sleep—side by side.1 Crocheted together like a human blanket, one man’s
head next to his neighbor’s feet, they cover the sleeping surface such that it is
impossible to tell whether they are in the wooden galley of a slave ship, the packed
dirt of a refugee camp, or the cement floor of a jail cell. If the visitor passed by
quickly without reading the caption accompanying the photo, she would likely
assume that the image was related to the slave trade: the word “kidnapped” appears
prominently in the exhibit. One thing is certain: the men in the photo are suffering,
and their suffering evokes in the visitor a visceral mix of horror and pity.
The photo was originally published by the New York Times on November
6, 2005. It appeared on the front page of the paper and accompanied a cover story
about prison overcrowding in Africa.2 The article focused on Malawi’s Maula

*

Clinical Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I would like to thank my clinic students, who have
recognized the humanity of their clients and worked tirelessly to protect their dignity and promote
their legal rights. I have obtained their express permission to include the excerpts from student
journals reproduced below. I would also like to thank the clinic’s Malawian partners, especially the
Paralegal Advisory Services Institute, for the many lessons they have taught me over the years.
Finally, my thanks to colleagues at Cornell and Drexel law schools, who provided helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this article, and to Tayler Woelke for her assistance with research and editing.
1
The photo is also prominent on the museum’s home page. See Equal Just. Initiative, The Legacy
Museum: From Enslavement to Mass Incarceration, https://museumandmemorial.eji.org/museum
(last visited July 17, 2018).
2
Michael Wines, The Forgotten of Africa, Wasting Away in Jails Without Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
6, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/06/world/africa/the-forgotten-of-africa-wastingaway-in-jails-without-trial.html.
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prison, where the prison cells were so crowded that men slept on their sides, head
to toe, with scarcely a millimeter of space between them. Once each night, an
inmate would give the signal for everyone to turn over simultaneously; apart from
that fleeting opportunity to stretch and turn, the crush of bodies surrounding them
prevented all movement.3 Each cellblock, designed for 50–60 prisoners, contained
approximately 150 men. They spent fourteen hours a day locked in the cell, where
they shared a single toilet. Without clean water and soap, prisoners were unable to
fend off disease, and many lost their lives.4
The Times explained that the overcrowding was attributable, in large part,
to the backlog of pretrial, or “remand” cases.5 Malawi has no jail system. Rather,
prisoners awaiting trial are housed in the same prison as convicted prisoners,
separated only by a flimsy wire fence.6 Prisoners receive one meal per day
consisting of boiled maize flour; occasionally, it comes with beans or peas.7
Sometimes they receive no food at all.8 Many of them await trial for years without
ever speaking to a lawyer. Missing court files cause further delays; without a
computerized case-tracking system, many prisoners simply get lost in the system.
Like many others, I was appalled by the conditions depicted in the photo
and read the accompanying article with interest. At the time, I was preparing to take
a new job directing the international human rights clinic at Northwestern University
Pritzker School of Law. I was looking for potential clinical projects and wondered
whether the clinic could assist with prison overcrowding in Malawi. I mentioned
my interest to Tom Geraghty, the director of Northwestern’s Bluhm Legal Clinic.
As it happened, Tom knew someone who was working in Malawi’s prisons with
the international non-governmental organization Penal Reform International (PRI).
He put us in touch. A little more than a year later, I headed to Malawi with six of
my students after putting together a fairly free-form work plan with PRI’s
assistance.
I have since returned to Malawi twenty times, bringing more than 60
students and 15 volunteer lawyers.9 Our work has led to the release of over 290
prisoners, most of whom had risked execution; others faced a lingering death from
disease and malnutrition in Malawi’s prisons. The purpose of this article, however,
is not to trumpet our clinic’s hard-won achievements, but to discuss some of the
3

Id.
A 2005 study found that tuberculosis, scabies, diarrhea, sexually transmitted infections, coughs,
malnutrition, malaria and bilharzia were common diseases among the prison population. See FIDELIS
EDGE KANYONGOLO, MALAWI: JUSTICE SECTOR AND THE RULE OF LAW 124 (2006).
5
Wines, supra note 3.
6
Vera Mlangazuwa Chirwa (Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa),
Prisons in Malawi, A.C.H.R. Ser. IV no. 9 (June 28, 2001).
7
Rachel Banning-Lover, Behind the Walls of Malawi’s Harshest Prisons—In Pictures, THE
GUARDIAN (July 29, 2016, 5:21 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-developmentprofessionals-network/gallery/2016/jul/29/malawis-harshest-prisons-humanitarian-msf. See Olivier
De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Mission to Malawi: 12–22 July, End of
Mission Statement, at 13 (July 22, 2013).
8
See De Schutter, supra note 7, at 13. Masangano v Att’y Gen., High Court of Malawi [MWHC]
31 (Nov. 9, 2009) (Malawi).
9
In 2014, I began teaching an international human rights clinic at Cornell Law School, and brought
the Malawi project with me.
4
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complex ethical, moral, and political questions raised by my clinic’s legal advocacy
on behalf of Malawian prisoners.10 By describing scenarios from our fieldwork, I
seek to illustrate the fraught strategic judgments and moral choices that permeate a
certain kind of human rights advocacy. My analysis of these scenarios draws not
only from the fields of legal ethics, critical theory, and law reform, but also from
the observations of development economists.
This essay is guided by the concept of “reflective equilibrium,” a process
that “involves going back and forth between our beliefs in the form of carefully
considered judgments in response to a range of cases, the ethical principles that
underlie those judgments, and the general theoretical considerations that support
the ethical principles.”11 At a more prosaic level, it is an attempt to put into
narrative form a sometimes disjointed and confusing amalgamation of experiences.
As Kennedy notes, this gives rise to certain narrative choices that may ultimately
obscure “the muddle of practice, experienced as a mix of intuition, confusion, and
quick thinking”12 that sometimes characterizes human rights lawyering. But
narrative choices are essential to any good story, and this article is, in essence, a
tale about a human rights lawyer and her students who embarked on a journey of
human rights advocacy in a foreign legal system. Along the way, they made good
and bad decisions, were able to escape harm, and learned valuable lessons about
their limits and potential. It is these lessons, many of them painful, that inspired this
writing.
Part I of this article provides a short overview of Malawi’s legal system.
Part II is divided into three sections that describe some of the moral dilemmas and
cultural challenges I have encountered during my field work with students. The first
of these involves an ethical problem that arose during my initial visit to Malawi as
a new clinical professor in 2007. The second addresses the clinic’s role in
perpetuating a donor-driven, aid-dependent legal culture. The third illustrates the
very real dangers of cultural incompetence.
Part III lays out why, despite the imperfect nature of our clinical work in
Malawi, the project could serve as a useful model for sustained human rights
advocacy—particularly in the clinical context. Here, I describe a twelve-year
project spearheaded by the clinic to obtain new sentencing hearings for
approximately 175 death-sentenced prisoners after a critical change in the law
allowed for the presentation of mitigating evidence at sentencing. I incorporate
some of the lessons learned from scholars in the field of justice reform to support

10

This is not an easy article to write, in part because it exposes my own inadequacy in navigating
the cultural barriers that separate me from my Malawian colleagues, and in part because it reveals
my shortcomings as a clinical professor. But such is the nature of critical reflection, and it would
be of little interest to anyone if the article failed to explore my ambivalence about the legacy of
our multi-year engagement in Malawi. In this, I am the embodiment of the ambivalent human
rights advocate described by Peter Rosenblum in his seminal article on our profession. Peter
Rosenblum, Teaching Human Rights: Ambivalent Activism, Multiple Discourses, and Lingering
Dilemmas, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 301, 304-305 (2002).
11
W. BRADLEY WENDEL, ETHICS AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 22 (2014).
12
David Kennedy, Spring Break, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1377, 1379 (1985).
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an incremental, problem-based approach to clinical work in the Global South.13 I
explain how the Malawi project has provided valuable learning opportunities for
students, even though my pedagogical method consciously diverges from the
favored clinical teaching model that emphasizes student autonomy and control over
individual cases. I also address critiques of human rights advocacy in general, and
human rights clinics in particular, in describing why I believe this model strikes an
appropriate balance between pedagogical objectives and service to an
underrepresented community. I conclude that the long-term nature of the clinic’s
collaboration with local partners in Malawi, combined with our focus on individual
client representation, have allowed us to maximize the impact of the project on
students and clients alike.14
I. MALAWI FACTS AND FIGURES15
Malawi is a gorgeous, land-locked country approximately the size of
Pennsylvania sandwiched between Tanzania to the north, Zambia to the west, and
Mozambique to the east and south. One long border lies adjacent to Lake Malawi,
the third largest lake in Africa and the ninth largest lake in the world.16 Much of the
country lies in the upland valley that is the southern end of the East African Rift
Valley. The climate is pleasant in most regions of the country, without the
punishing humidity of the coast. Since the fall of dictator Hastings Kamuzu Banda
in 1994, the country has enjoyed twenty-five years of peace and relative stability,

In my view, “Global South” is the best term for countries that used to be referred to as “less
developed” or “developing, for the same reasons identified by Hammergren.” See LINN A.
HAMMERGREN, JUSTICE REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT 5 (2014). At the same time, I’m cognizant
of the drawbacks to this terminology identified by Sarah Jackson. She notes that while she uses
the term, she does so “with full recognition that this binary distinction is lacking. It negates power
imbalances between countries within the Global North and Global South, concealing inequality,
downplaying class and its intersection with gender, race, age and so on. It is a top-down
construct.” Sarah Jackson, FROM CHARITY TO TRANSFORMATIVE SOLIDARITY – THE CHANGING
PLACE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS ECO-SYSTEM 4 ( Aug.
28, 2018).
14
In my research for this article, I revisited some of the classic critiques of the human rights
movement. One in particular I found inspirational and maddening in equal measure: David
Kennedy’s Spring Break, published in 1985. Kennedy’s piece was inspirational in its use of
narrative storytelling techniques to reflect on his experience during a human rights investigation in
Uruguay. It is maddening to the extent that Kennedy uses what was, in essence, a three-day trip to
a foreign country as a launching pad for an essay that aims to expose the fraught moral choices
confronting a human rights advocate. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1377.
15
This thumbnail sketch fails to do justice to the complexity of Malawian culture and political
development. Nevertheless, it attempts to highlight the more salient facts relevant to this paper
without falling into the common pitfalls of Western writing about Africa. See Binyavanga Wainaina,
How to Write About Africa, GRANTA, (Jan. 19, 2006), https://granta.com/how-to-write-aboutafrica/.
16
Scientists estimate that more than 1,000 different species live in Lake Malawi, many of them
endemic. (This is more than the total number of species found in all of the lakes and rivers of Europe
and North America combined.) See 10 Largest Lakes in the World, WORLDATLAS,
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/10-largest-lakes-in-the-world.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
13
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despite an ethnically diverse population and struggling economy.17 It boasts a
reputation as one of the friendliest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, proudly
displaying the moniker “The Warm Heart of Africa” in tourist brochures. Residents
are generally pleasant to outsiders, although quite reserved in rural areas. It is one
of the most densely populated African countries, with a total population of
approximately 18.6 million.18
Malawi is also the sixth poorest nation in the world, measured by gross
domestic product at purchasing power parity.19 The per capita gross national
income is $320.20 More than seventy percent of the population survives on just
$1.90 per day.21 According to the Special Rapporteur on Food, one-fourth of
Malawi’s population is “ultra-poor,” meaning that they have an income “below the
estimated cost of food providing the minimum daily recommended calorie
intake.”22 Simply put, they don’t have enough to eat. About fifty percent of children
show signs of chronic malnutrition, including stunted growth and wasting.23
Malawi’s justice sector is largely dependent on outside aid to maintain
operations.24 Government allocations to the Ministry of Justice are grossly
inadequate. A 2006 review of the justice sector noted that because of underfunding,
justice sector institutions “cannot obtain material resources as basic as texts of
legislation, law reports, vehicles, typewriters, computers and stationery—or even
adequately maintained buildings.”25 A lawyer’s attempt to file a simple legal
document can be stymied by her inability to find a functioning photocopy machine
that has sufficient paper and toner.26
For Malawian lawyers, it can be difficult to ascertain precisely what the law
is. Legislation may be published months after passage, and until recently was only
available in hard copy. Judicial decisions are not routinely published. Record

17

James Chavula, 19-Year-Old Prayer for Peace, THE NATION (May 15, 2013),
http://mwnation.com/19-year-old-prayer-for-peace/.
18
WORLD BANK, MALAWI COUNTRY INDICATORS, https://data.worldbank.org/country/malawi (last
visited June 7, 2018).
19
Jonathan Gregson, Poorest Countries in the World, GLOBAL FINANCE (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/the-poorest-countries-in-the-world?page=12.
According to Global Finance magazine, “PPP takes into account the relative cost of living and the
inflation rates of countries, rather than using just exchange rates, which may distort the real
differences in income.” Valentina Pasquali, The Poorest Countries in the World, GLOBAL FINANCE
(Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/the-poorest-countries-in-theworld [http://archive.is/jgOag].
20
WORLD BANK, supra note 18.
21
WORLD
BANK,
POVERTY
AND
EQUITY
DATA
PORTAL:
MALAWI,
http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/MWI (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
22
De Schutter, supra note 8, at 2.
23
Id.
24
See KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 10.
25
Id.
26
Once, in preparing for a training workshop, I went to three separate shops offering
photocopying services. The copiers were broken in the first two. In the third, the copier was
functioning, but the shop lacked electricity to power it. This is by no means unusual. For a good
overview of the infrastructure problems and resource constraints that pervade many legal systems
in the Global South, see Hammergren, supra note 13 at 28-29.
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keeping as a whole is exceedingly poor.27 Case-related information is manually
transcribed, and filing systems are haphazard at best.28
The legal aid system cannot begin to meet the needs of individuals detained
on criminal charges. As of 2006, there were approximately 180 lawyers in private
practice in the entire country, most of whom handled civil matters exclusively.29
The only certified law school in the country graduates approximately 30–35
students a year30—although during recent years, graduation was delayed as a result
of lengthy student and faculty strikes.31 Over the last twelve years, the population
has increased by more than 4 million while the number of lawyers has increased by
at most 300.32
At any given time, there are anywhere from 7–20 legal aid lawyers in the
entire country.33 Legal Aid is grossly under-funded, particularly when compared to
the Director of Public Prosecutions, whose budget in 2006 was more than twice the
amount allotted for Legal Aid.34 Legal Aid lawyers spend most of their time on
civil matters,35 and often lack the time, resources, and motivation to visit
prospective clients in prison. The vast majority of prisoners never speak to a lawyer
and are unrepresented at trial.36 Although Malawi’s Constitution provides that an
individual accused of a crime has the right “where it is required in the interests of
justice to be provided with legal representation at the expense of the State,”37 in
practice, the State only provides legal aid in homicide cases.38 Legal aid lawyers

27

KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 11.
In 2013, a volunteer lawyer helped the clinic search for the files of approximately 192 prisoners
who had been given mandatory death sentences. The file room of one of the High Courts was located
in an unused latrine where files were stacked on the floor. After searching for seven months, he was
only able to locate 86 of the 192 case files. The reliance on paper files, and the lack of systematic
case tracking methods, are commonplace in much of the Global South. See Hammergren, supra n.
13, at 26.
29
David McQuoid-Mason, Assessment of Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in Malawi, June
2006, ¶¶7.1–7.2 (on file with author).
30
Id. at ¶7.5.
31
See, e.g., Hummy Humphreys, Breaking News: Chancellor College Has Been Shut Down, NEWS
WATCH REVIEWS (July 19, 2016), http://newswatchreviews.com/breaking-news-chancellorcollege-has-been-shut-down/; Malawi: Court Overrules President on Lecturer Strike, U. WORLD
NEWS
(Mar.
27,
2011),
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=
20110326123235692.
32
WORLD BANK, MALAWI COUNTRY INDICATORS, https://data.worldbank.org/country/malawi (last
visited June 7, 2018); Membership Directory, MALAWI LAW SOCIETY, http://malawilawsociety.
net/index.php/membership/membership-directory/file, (last visited June 7, 2018).
33
In 2006, McQuoid-Mason noted that there were five lawyers in the southern region, and nine in
the central region—of whom four had been in the office for less than four months. Supra note 29,
at ¶8.2. In 2005, Kanyongolo reported that the Legal Aid department had only 10 lawyers.
KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 112.
34
McQuoid-Mason, supra note 29, at ¶8.1. McQuoid-Mason observed that at the time of his study,
Legal Aid had five vehicles, four of which were “beyond repair and not used.” Id. at ¶8.3.
35
Id. at ¶8.5.
36
2006, one report estimated that fewer than ten percent of criminal defendants were represented at
trial. KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 112.
37
CONSTITUTION OF MALAWI, § 42(2)(f)(v).
38
KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 112.
28
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are often inexperienced and poorly trained, and turnover is high. 39 In March 2016,
the Legal Aid Bureau announced that it had run out of money and could no longer
represent indigent criminal defendants in homicide cases.40
English is the official language of the courts, although only one percent of
the country’s population understands it.41 Interpretation is typically provided by the
court clerk, who simultaneously transcribes the proceedings (in longhand).
II. LESSONS LEARNED—AND RE-LEARNED
Working in Malawi has never been easy for me. To get there, my students
and I take an exhausting and expensive series of flights over two full days. Working
conditions are less than ideal. We have twice run training conferences with no
electricity at all. During catastrophic flooding in early 2015, we had no running
water for two days. Malawians have a flexible concept of time, and the lack of a
reliable internet network makes communication difficult—factors that make it
challenging to organize our work in advance of our visits. My students and I have
periodically fallen sick, mainly from food and water-borne bacteria. We are at risk
of exposure to tuberculosis and other diseases through our work in the prisons, and
malaria is a constant concern. But the work has a profound impact on both the
students who are fortunate enough to travel to Malawi, as well as on the prison
population we serve.
Over the course of the twelve years that I have worked in Malawi, I have
learned a great deal about the challenges of direct engagement with a foreign legal
system in one of the poorest countries in the world. This section describes three
situations that illustrate the ethical, moral, and pedagogical challenges presented by
our Malawi advocacy.
A. Ethics, Shmethics
My first trip to Malawi was off to a bad start. I had gotten a stomach bug as
soon as I landed, and was sharing a room with a student I didn’t know very well.
One of my students announced that she was an insectophobe, and became slightly
hysterical every time we saw a large fly or a spider. Another student had a panic
attack shortly after we arrived. A third student forgot his computer at airport
security, and was inexplicably walking around without shoelaces. On our first day
of work, when our local partner arrived to pick us up at our cockroach-infested
lodge, two of my students had to be woken, as they had slept through their alarm.
My stress level was, shall we say, slightly elevated.
After everyone finally piled into two Range Rovers, we drove to the offices
of the Paralegal Advisory Services Institute (PASI)42 to discuss how we would
39

Id. at 112–113.
See Owen Khamula, Malawi Legal Aid Bureau Puts on Hold Murder Cases: No Funds, NYASA
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2016, http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-legal-aid-bureau-puts-on-hold-murdercases-no-funds/.
41
KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 114.
42
PASI is the premier organization of paralegals in Malawi, and perhaps in Sub-Saharan Africa.
For a discussion of the role of paralegals in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Hammergren, supra n. 13, at
140.
40
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organize our work for the duration of our visit. PASI is a non-governmental
organization that trains paralegals to educate prisoners about their legal rights.
Their teams of paralegals visit the prisons every day, conducting interactive
workshops using skits and role-playing to instruct prisoners (many of whom are
illiterate) about criminal law and procedure. Over the years, they have educated
thousands of prisoners, helping them seek bail and sentence reductions, and
facilitating their access to courts. Their work has led to a dramatic reduction in the
size of the remand population.43
The PASI paralegals identified fourteen prisoners who had been held on
remand for several years. Each was charged with murder, which carried the
mandatory death penalty. None of them had ever spoken to a lawyer. Our task was
to meet with the prisoners, interview them, and ascertain whether they were
interested in pleading guilty if the prosecution reduced the charges from murder to
manslaughter.
Adam Stapleton, a British lawyer working with PRI, announced that the
students would be divided into two groups. One group would work with the state’s
advocates in the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Another group
would work with Legal Aid. The group working with the DPP would review the
prisoners’ case files and write memos analyzing the evidence in reference to the
Malawi Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code. These
memoranda would also recommend a course of action: either prosecution for
murder, reduction of the charges in exchange for a guilty plea, or dismissal. The
group assigned to Legal Aid would interview the prisoners and write up memos for
defense lawyers based on the information they gathered. In cooperation with the
judiciary, Adam and PASI had also scheduled court dates at which point the
prisoners’ cases could be heard.
I listened with growing dismay as Adam explained our mission. His plan
sounded perfectly logical, except for the massive conflict of interest presented by
his proposed division of labor. Clinic students would simultaneously be assisting
both sides in the same case. Adam assured me that both the DPP and Legal Aid
were fully aware of our work plan and welcomed our participation. Moreover, if
we only worked for one side, we would jeopardize the prisoners’ ability to obtain
prompt judicial review of their cases. He explained that neither the DPP nor Legal
Aid had the capacity to staff the cases. Some of the prisoners had been languishing
for years in pretrial detention, and if we didn’t take advantage of this opportunity
now, they might not be back before the courts for years to come.
At the time, I had no access to the rules of ethics governing Malawian
lawyers.44 Malawi has an adversarial criminal justice system founded on rules of
See Clifford Msiska, On the Front Lines: Insights from Malawi’s Paralegal Advisory Service, in
OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, PRETRIAL DETENTION 2008, at 77–78.
44
In 2016, I finally obtained a copy of the rules of professional responsibility that govern Malawian
lawyers. Chapter 7 of the Malawi Law Society Code of Ethics addresses conflicts of interest: “A
lawyer must not act when there is a conflict or potential conflict of interest between lawyer and
client unless the client consents and it is in the client’s best interest that the lawyer so acts.” CODE
OF ETHICS ch. 7, r. 7 (MALAWI L. SOC. 2006). Our work was consistent with this provision, as we
obtained the prisoners’ permission to act on their behalf, and it was in the prisoners’ best interest
that we do so.
43
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procedure inherited from the British colonial regime. Both defense counsel and the
prosecution had not only consented to our participation, but actively welcomed our
involvement. I decided that we could go ahead, provided that the students obtained
the prisoners’ consent to our arrangement.45 I also forbade the students to speak to
their classmates who were assisting the other party. The students reported directly
to lawyers working for the DPP and Legal Aid, but they all came to me, as the sole
faculty supervisor, with questions about their respective work.
I randomly assigned the students to either the prosecution or legal aid. Those
who had the task of reviewing prosecution case files were initially envious of their
peers who were interviewing actual clients in the prisons. But they soon realized
the impact they were having. One enthusiastic student wrote in her journal:
I cannot believe it. I cannot believe it. The Director of Public Prosecutions
agreed with the 3 opinions my team and I wrote. Oh my goodness. I can’t
believe it. My head is reeling and I can’t sit still. Can you believe this? I
can’t. It is amazing. . . . We are bouncing off the walls and can’t wait to
dig into more of the files and write more opinions. Bring on the files, bring
on the files. My team is ready to write opinions until our fingertips bleed.
I do not want lunch, I just want another file. The more files we can review,
the more opinions we write, the more opinions the DPP can review and
possibly approve, and the more remanded inmates we can provide with an
opportunity to have their day in court before we leave.46

After one week, the students switched sides and began working on a new
set of cases. Those who were formerly prosecutors’ aides started working with the
defense, and vice versa. Once again, our local partners found this perfectly
acceptable. Adam pointed out that in the United Kingdom, it is not uncommon for
prosecutors to work simultaneously as defense attorneys (although certainly not on
the same cases).47 But in the United States, I would have been fiercely critical of
such a practice as inimical to the best interests of the defendants.
By the end of our two-week stay, four prisoners had pleaded guilty to
manslaughter and were sentenced to time served. All were immediately released.
Two others were released on bail. In the weeks after we returned home, six more
prisoners were released after pleading guilty. The students were ecstatic, and our
local partners pronounced the project a success.
I returned to Malawi a year later and replicated the same model, with similar
results. But the following year, our partners requested our assistance with four
capital murder trials. I explained that in the trial setting, my students would not be
One of my colleagues insightfully pointed out that the prisoners’ “consent” could not be
considered truly free and informed, owing to the inherently coercive circumstances of their detention
and the lack of alternative options for legal representation.
46
M.S., Student Journal (Spring 2007) (on file with Author).
47
There is no universal consensus on what constitutes a conflict of interest. In her article on attorney
ethics at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judith A. McMorrow
describes a case in which a former prosecutor was allowed to join a defense team for a client
notwithstanding his prior involvement as a prosecutor in two cases against the accused. Judith A.
McMorrow, Creating Norms of Attorney Conduct in International Tribunals: A Case Study of the
ICTY, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 139, 164 (2007).
45
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able to assist both sides. This time, we worked exclusively with the defense,
interviewing the prisoners, conducting investigations, and transporting witnesses to
court. The legal aid lawyers had not even spoken to their clients before we arrived
and had done no investigation. We prepped the cases during our first week in the
country, and the capital trials were held during the second week.48
So why was it acceptable for the students to work on both sides of the fence
when we were negotiating guilty pleas, but not when we went to trial? As an initial
matter, the negotiation process is less adversarial than a trial. Both sides were
working together to settle the cases. Although pretrial negotiations are certainly
part of the adversarial process, the nature of a trial is fundamentally different. There
is no collaboration, and each side works independently to develop a theory of the
case, prepare its witnesses, and implement its trial strategy. Moreover, these were
death penalty trials, and I would never have allowed my students to work on the
prosecution side in a capital case.
As I write this, it strikes me that my decisions in the field were guided by
little more than my internal moral compass, cloaked in flimsy rationalization. This
is a danger inherent in human rights work, and one that has been noted by a number
of scholars: there are few ethical rules that bind international human rights lawyers
operating in foreign jurisdictions.49 Are we, in essence, acting as cowboy lawyers,
free-wheeling through a foreign jurisdiction where we make up the rules as we go
along?
I think not. At all times, we acted in accordance with the requests of our
local partners, consistent with local practices and customs. In 2006—one year
before our first Malawi trip—an independent consultant noted that there was a
backlog of 500 homicide cases in Malawi.50 At the time, paralegals and legal interns
were “drafting alternative murder and manslaughter charges and recommendations
for consideration by the DPP” in an attempt to clear the backlog. 51 The DPP
48

The idea that clinic students would help investigate and defend four capital murder cases over the
course of two weeks would undoubtedly raise eyebrows in the U.S. capital defense community. This
illustrates another conundrum inherent in the clinic’s Malawi work: we never have the time or the
resources to handle cases in accordance with established guidelines for capital case representation.
See generally American Bar Association: Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003). Notwithstanding these
constraints, the results were positive: one defendant was acquitted, the prosecution dismissed the
charges against another, one pleaded guilty and received a 5-year sentence, and a fourth was
convicted and sentenced to 15 years.
49
See Laura Notess, Current Developments 2013–2014: Preserving the Human in Human Rights:
Incorporating Informed Consent into the Work of International Human Rights NGOs, 27 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 765 (2014); Nell Moley, Confronting the Challenges of Ethical Accountability in
International Human Rights Lawyering, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 359, 361—64 (2014); Caroline
Bettinger-Lopez et. al, Redefining Human Rights Lawyering Through the Lens of Critical Theory:
Lessons for Pedagogy and Practice, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 337, 384 (2011). On the
ethical hazards of international legal practice generally (without focusing explicitly on human rights
practice), see Robert E. Lutz, Ethics and International Practice: A Guide to the Professional
Responsibilities of Practitioners, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 53 (1992/1993); Detlev Vagts,
International Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 378, 378
(1998).
50
McQuoid-Mason supra note 29 at ¶6.2.
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Id. at ¶21.5.
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requested, and the consultant recommended, that donors provide funding for twenty
legal interns to assist prosecutors in processing the homicide cases. Our work was
in line with ongoing efforts to ensure access to justice for prisoners and filled an
unmet need in the Malawian legal system.
As noted above, all of our partners not only consented to this arrangement
but welcomed our participation. Their informed consent was critical to my decision
to set aside concerns over the clinic team’s conflict of interest. The Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility allow lawyers to represent parties with adverse
interests if the client provides informed consent,52 and scholars have emphasized
the centrality of informed consent to international human rights advocacy. 53 As
Notess points out, “Because informed consent resonates both with principles found
in the Model Rules and with general human rights values such as voice and
participation, it can provide an important means for American lawyers to consider
international legal ethical issues.”54
Was our facilitation of plea agreements consistent with international best
practices? Clearly not. Students in the same clinic should not be obtaining
privileged information from prisoners, while other students simultaneously advise
the prosecution on a course of action in the prisoner’s case that best serves the
public interest. The greatest problem lay in my supervision of both sides.
Technically, the students reported to senior prosecutors and legal aid attorneys. But
I was aware of the work that each side was conducting, and I reviewed each memo
written by the students assisting the prosecution. Had there been two supervisors,
and two teams of students that maintained a strict separation, the arrangement
would have been far less problematic. But at the time, I felt I owed a pedagogical
duty of supervision to my students since I had no way to gauge the quality of
instruction they would receive from our Malawian partners.
This created a significant pedagogical challenge that, as a new clinical
professor, I struggled to address. With my students, I was frank about the conflict
and my discomfort with the situation, explaining that there was a difference
between “best practices” in the United States and “best practices under the
circumstances” in Malawi. But to a large extent, my teaching “moment” was lost
to my own confusion about whether what we were doing was ethical. In my early
days of teaching, I was less inclined to share my own apprehensions with my
students, as I thought I needed to project confidence and leadership. Today, I would
handle it slightly differently, by creating greater opportunities for discussion about
the issue at hand with students and partners alike.
Would I do it again? Yes—although I would be sure to bring two
supervisors so that we could have a stricter separation between the two sides. This
would not only be consistent with Malawi’s ethical rules55 but with broader

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, r. 1.7. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
Cf. Notess, supra note 49, at 775 (advocating for the adoption of an informed consent standard in
international human rights litigation). Notess observes, however, that clients in civil law countries
generally cannot waive conflicts of interest, even if they expressly wish to do so. Id. at 777.
54
Id. at 777.
55
See CODE OF ETHICS , supra n. 44.
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principles of moral choice.56 On balance, the “good” that we achieved—the
liberation of twelve prisoners who had been subjected to cruel and inhuman
treatment as well as arbitrary and prolonged detention—outweighed our potential
conflict of interest, particularly given that all parties consented to our participation.
This consequentialist approach57 may seem overly simplistic, but it coheres with
the reality of practicing law in a country whose legal institutions are incapable of
protecting the constitutional rights of individuals caught up in the criminal justice
system. It is also broadly consistent with ethical principles promoted by scholars in
the field.58 Finally, by giving voice to prisoners who were otherwise powerless to
tell their stories, our clinic fulfilled what is perhaps the highest ethical duty of any
legal professional: to uphold her client’s human dignity.59
B. Advancing Human Rights, or Reinforcing Donor Dependence?
Anyone who works in Sub-Saharan Africa over time becomes accustomed
to the particular vocabulary employed by the vast network of donors that underwrite
development projects.60 As a general rule, legal reform work falls under the
incongruous heading of “governance” assistance.61 When you organize a training
workshop, you are “building capacity.”62 When you share your experience with
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See WENDEL, supra note 11, at 49.
As summarized by W. Bradley Wendel in his helpful primer on legal ethics, “[c]onsequentialism
is a moral theory holding that the right thing to do in any particular situation is that which will
produce the best outcome, the greatest net balance of good over evil.” Id.
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organizations have adopted their own internal codes of ethics. See, e.g., Code of Conduct, INT’L
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practice cultural sensitivity; avoid conflicts of interest; and take steps to ensure accountability.
Bettinger-Lopez et. al., supra note 49, at 384 (citing Rachel Barish, Professional Responsibility for
International Human Rights Lawyers: A Proposed Paradigm (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors)).
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It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 815 (2005).
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local partners, or aid in the drafting of a report, you are providing “technical
assistance.”63 If you propose a short-term project that aims to address a particular
need at a particular time, you may be chastised for failing to consider the
“sustainability” of your intervention.64 If you draft a grant proposal, you must
include the specific “outputs” that you aim to generate.65 I don’t mean to sound
disparaging. The individuals engaged in development work have learned the hard
way that projects lacking these elements will fail to achieve lasting change.66
Malawi depends on international aid for about forty percent of its national
budget, far more than is considered optimal by development economists.67 On a
drive through the country, the visitor regularly sees billboards proclaiming that this
school, that clinic, or this stretch of highway has been constructed with funds
provided by an international donor. Local NGOs are completely dependent on
foreign aid to survive.68
There is no question that the quantity of aid provided has had a profound
effect on local institutions, and not all for the good. In 2013, Malawi was rocked
by a major corruption scandal in which public servants—including the Minister of
Justice—were implicated in the theft of approximately 32 million dollars in public
funds, or about one percent of Malawi’s GDP.69 Major donors quickly froze
pending transactions, and Malawi spiraled into a political and economic crisis from
which it has not yet recovered. So what does our clinic work have to do with all
this?
The level of deprivation in Malawi—and its effects on the justice system—
permeates the nature of our advocacy and our relationships with local partners. My
http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/378-organize-capacity-development-activities-to-learn-thebasic-concepts-of-safe-cities-for-women-and-violence-against-women-and-girls.html.
63
See, e.g., The Reality of Aid 2016 Report Theme Statement, THE REALITY OF AID (Nov. 24, 2015),
http://www.realityofaid.org/2015/11/the-reality-of-aid-2016-report-theme-statement-technicalcooperation-and-capacity-development-as-an-aid-modality/.
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Development, 26 J. INT’L DEVELOPMENT (2014), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/
jid.3033.
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(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.professionalgrantwriter.org/understanding-difference-outputsoutcomes.
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For a pithy description of the shortcomings of typical donor-funded projects, see Nancy Birdsall,
Seven Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings, in REINVENTING FOREIGN AID 515 (William
Easterly ed., 2008).
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students have reacted to this in a variety of ways. Upon witnessing the primitive
filing systems used by court clerks, one of my students suggested pooling our
resources to buy filing cabinets. Others have expressed a desire to send secondhand laptops or books to local lawyers. With respect to our clients and their
families, whose poverty is wrenching to witness, one feels an overwhelming desire
to do something to help—even if the effects are fleeting. This often takes the form
of small donations for food, housing, or transportation. Yet these small gestures do
little to offset the feeling of helplessness that my students often feel in the face of
overwhelming human suffering.
For a lawyer with no technical or scholarly background in the field of
development aid, I have sometimes struggled to explain why buying filing cabinets
for every courthouse in Malawi would not solve the problem of missing case files
in Malawi. And my students’ responses are not so different from those of donors
who have funded the construction of courthouses after observing the dilapidated
state of courtrooms.70 Providing material resources offers a quick and easy “fix”
for perceived problem. What it does not address, however, are the less tangible
obstacles to legal reform, including organizational incompetence, resistance to
change, lack of ongoing training, and procedural rigidity.71
The first year I took clinic students to Malawi, it never occurred to me that
our local partner—the Paralegal Advisory Services Institute—might expect me to
provide funding for its role in our joint project. After all, we were doing work that
fit comfortably within PASI’s mandate: educating prisoners about their legal rights
and reducing prison overcrowding. I was oblivious to the added burden that our
presence imposed. I didn’t see that every time they drove us to the prison, they used
up some of their fuel supplies. I didn’t realize that when they copied case files for
us, they used up precious paper and toner for their copy machine. And when they
called me to discuss the day’s agenda, they paid for the “air time” required for those
calls. If I had stopped to think about these expenses, I might have told myself that
these were all part and parcel of an NGO’s daily work.
After our first visit, however, I asked Adam Stapleton—the lawyer working
for Penal Reform International who had conceived of our project—whether I should
make a donation to PASI in conjunction with future visits. PASI was struggling to
survive, and their paralegals were doing heroic work. From what I could tell, PASI
was the only NGO that regularly visited the prisons. By contrast, most lawyers
never set foot in the prison, in part because they lacked transportation (or money
for fuel). I also got the sense that some lawyers felt it was beneath them to spend
time in prisons. The paralegals, by contrast, knew the prisoners by name and treated
them with dignity and respect, even risking their own health to help the prisoners
vindicate their rights.
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For an explanation of why the construction of new courthouses is usually not the most efficient
use of donor funds, see HAMMERGREN, supra note 13, at 111.
71
See HAMMERGREN, supra note 13, at 29. Providing equipment and software to facilitate case
tracking would seem to be another easy solution, but as Hammergren explains, most donors fail to
ensure that aid recipients are using the equipment for its intended purpose, that staff are adequately
trained, and that personnel are monitoring the quality of data entered into the system. As a result,
“the system ‘collapses’ for lack of attention.” Id. at 94.
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Adam thought it was an excellent suggestion, so on my next clinic trip to
Malawi, I decided to allocate $1,500 to PASI as recognition for the support they
provided to our team during our two-week visit.72 At the end of our visit, however,
PASI’s legal director took me aside and suggested that in the future, PASI should
prepare a budget reflecting its actual costs—which he implied were much higher
than the amount I had donated. I agreed that this would be a sensible way to
proceed. Consequently, before our next visit, PASI sent me a $2,500 budget that
included allocations for the following: copy paper; toner; fuel for driving us around
town; airtime for the paralegals’ cell phones; labor costs; lunch allowances for
paralegals working with us; and the costs of servicing their vehicles. At first, I was
taken aback. It didn’t seem appropriate for us to cover some of these expenses. But
Adam explained that these were standard costs that would be included in any budget
submitted to a donor in conjunction with a development assistance project.
Moreover, I learned that PASI was completely dependent on donor aid for survival,
and that paralegals often went months without receiving a salary because of
bureaucratic delays caused by donors’ own bureaucratic inefficiencies.73
I learned my next lesson in donor culture when my students and I organized
a workshop on the rights of individuals with mental disabilities in Zomba, the
former British colonial capital in southern Malawi. We had received a small grant
from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to cover the workshop expenses, including
travel and accommodation for out-of-town participants. We had invited a few
individuals to the workshop who lived in Zomba, including a local magistrate
judge. He approached me during a coffee break to demand a per diem for attending
the workshop. When I explained that local participants would not be granted a per
diem, he became irate. His expectation was that he would be paid for attending the
training workshop, in addition to receiving training materials, a free lunch, and
beverages. At the time, I found this both inexplicable and outrageous (particularly
since he snoozed throughout the afternoon sessions). I have since learned, however,
that it is not uncommon for donors to provide allowances—sometimes called
“sitting fees”—for all participants attending conferences and workshops.74
But the extent to which the justice system depends on outside aid goes much
deeper than these examples illustrate.75 Homicide trials in Malawi had long been
funded by foreign governments, including the Department for International
Development (DFID), the British equivalent of the U.S. Agency for International
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Development (USAID).76 When aid dried up in the late 2000s, homicide trials
stopped—and the prison population skyrocketed. When aid resumed, the courts
continued holding trials.77
The clinic has played a direct role in perpetuating this donor-dependent
system. In November 2012 and November 2013, our clinic participated in “camp
courts” in Kasungu prison, about two hours north of the nation’s capital. Camp
courts are an innovative response to prison overcrowding.78 Magistrates, who hear
misdemeanor and felony matters (with the exception of homicide and treason
cases), travel to the prisons along with their clerks to hear bail arguments on behalf
of the prisoners.79 The prisoners are unrepresented at these hearings. They cannot
afford legal representation, and as noted above, the right to free legal aid is only
recognized in homicide cases. There are often no lawyers present during these
hearings: most magistrates lack a law degree,80 while the prosecution is represented
by a police officer, and the prisoners represent themselves.
I had previously met with the presiding magistrate in Kasungu along with
the local police prosecutor and PASI paralegals to propose that clinic students
participate in a camp court. I suggested that the students represent the prisoners and
train paralegals in the story-telling style of advocacy prevalent in criminal defense
work in the United States. The prisoners would benefit from the students’ advocacy
skills, the other participants would gain exposure to a new form of advocacy, and
the students would learn valuable lawyering skills. Everyone thought it was a great
idea.
In November 2011, the day before the hearings, we traveled to the prison in
Kasungu to interview our clients. We arrived at the appointed time for the camp
court the following day, and I was informed that the magistrate’s car had broken
down. I went to find him, and after the magistrate and his clerk hailed me down by
the side of the road, we drove together to the prison. The prison officers took us
through the prison yard—a dirt enclosure where prisoners played bawo,81 ate, and
squeezed together in the sliver of shade adjoining one of the prison walls—and
brought us to a small classroom. The classroom, which opened directly onto the
yard, would serve as our courtroom for the day. Inside was a table and chair for the
76
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magistrate and clerk, and benches for the police-prosecutor, the detainees, and the
students.
The students represented a total of eight prisoners. They sat waiting their
turn in the dirt outside our “courtroom.” As each case was called, the prisoner
entered barefoot and took his place on a bench sandwiched between a student and
a paralegal. As each case was called, a student stood up and argued why her client
was entitled to be released on bail. The magistrate listened attentively to each,
occasionally asking questions, while the court clerk translated the arguments into
Chichewa for the prisoners. Curious prisoners occasionally poked their heads
inside. At the end of the day, the magistrate signed orders directing the immediate
release of three prisoners. The students were thrilled, the prisoners were grateful,
and all of the local participants praised the students’ work and expressed a desire
to repeat the exercise.
As we left the prison, I noticed the PASI paralegal handing out stacks of
Malawian kwacha (the local currency) to the magistrate, his clerk, and the police
prosecutor. My students noticed as well, and in whispers, asked what was going on.
Later, our paralegal partner explained that after every camp court, the participants
received allowances for lunch and transport costs—even if they lived locally, and
even though participation in bail hearings fell squarely within the job description
of those involved. The funds that PASI distributed came out of the money that the
clinic had given PASI to organize and provide support for our clinic work.
From an American lawyer’s perspective, this practice raised uncomfortable
questions about the relationship between money and justice. I have no reason to
believe that the magistrate’s receipt of what is called, in local parlance, a “daily
subsistence allowance,” affected his evaluation of the merits of each argument.
These were not bribes. They were (and are) a standard aspect of the criminal justice
system in Malawi.82 And in the United States, it can hardly be said that money plays
no role in the quality of justice received by individual defendants. 83 At least in
Malawi, the funding we provided served a group of defendants who were all equally
poor and equally deserving of access to the courts. Nevertheless, it was
disconcerting to see money passing hands to those entrusted with the administration
of justice.
The clinic became fully immersed in the local donor culture when, in 2012,
my students and I drafted a funding proposal on behalf of our local partner, the
Malawi Human Rights Commission, for a large-scale project designed to
implement Kafantayeni and Others v. Attorney General, a 2007 judgment of the
Malawi High Court striking down the mandatory death penalty.84 Prior to
Kafantayeni, the Malawian Penal Code provided that all prisoners convicted of
murder or treason would automatically be sentenced to death without regard for

Supra note 77 (noting that the cost of the average homicide trial includes “allowances for
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their personal background or the facts of the crime.85 But in 2007, following a wave
of similar judgments in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Uganda, and elsewhere, the
Malawi High Court held that the mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional.86
In 2010, the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal held that all prisoners sentenced to
the mandatory death penalty were entitled to be resentenced at hearings where they
could present mitigating evidence relating to the facts of the crime and their
individual life circumstances.87
In the wake of these decisions, I met with the Director of Public
Prosecutions, the Chief Legal Aid Advocate, human rights organizations, and
judges from both the Supreme Court and High Court to explore how the clinic
might assist in implementing the High Court’s mandate. Lawyers in Malawi had no
experience with the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence, and
judges had never had occasion to consider what mitigating circumstances might be
relevant in the capital sentencing context. I thought we could contribute to the
development of a workable model for the resentencing hearings. All of the relevant
actors concurred that the prisoners were entitled to be resentenced.
In 2010, in preparation for the resentencing hearings, my students and I
interviewed approximately 170 prisoners who had been given mandatory death
sentences. The Commissioner of Prisons gave us a week to complete this task. We
arrived at the prison early each morning. The prisoners—many of whom had been
incarcerated for decades—sat patiently in a line next to each student, waiting for
their chance to be interviewed. Some were clearly mentally ill, others sick with
AIDS, many weak and malnourished. We made no promises, but informed them
about the Kafantayeni decision and our efforts to obtain new sentencing hearings.
Yet, no matter how many meetings we held with relevant stakeholders, there was
no forward movement. As of December 2012, only one prisoner had been
resentenced—the lead plaintiff in the original court challenge in 2007. 88 In the
meantime, most prisoners lost hope, while others died.
I finally realized that without funding, the resentencing hearings would
likely never take place. It had seemed self-evident that the courts (along with
prosecutors and defense attorneys) would take responsibility for giving effect to a
binding legal decision by the High Court, which was later ratified by the Supreme
Court. My erroneous assumption parallels the misconceptions of the “liberal
legalist” paradigm that governed early scholars in the law and development
movement.89 Like those early scholars, I believed that a change in the law would
lead to a corresponding change in the law’s application. Because of my
inexperience on the ground, I assumed that local partners, having expressed
agreement as to the desirable outcome, would take the necessary steps to achieve
85
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it. What I failed to see was the lack of commitment and consensus as to the manner
in which that end would be achieved—a failure common to many development
assistance projects.90 As it turned out, without designated funding for investigations
and court hearings, the parties lacked an incentive to make the resentencing
hearings a priority.91
In early 2013, the clinic drafted a funding proposal in collaboration with the
Malawi Human Rights Commission. The funding would all go to local actors who
would be charged with implementing the court’s decision: the Malawi Human
Rights Commission, the judiciary, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Legal Aid,
pro bono lawyers, PASI, the law school, and others. The budget included, among
other things, allocations for stationery; laptop computers; transportation; fuel; and
accommodation and meal costs for judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and
paralegals. It even provided for meal allowances and fuel costs for the prison guards
responsible for transporting the prisoners to the sentencing hearings. The Malawi
Human Rights Commission agreed to serve as coordinator for the project.
Tilitonse, a Malawian grant-making authority supported by a group of
European governments, approved our proposal in late 2013. The allocation of
funding for what became known as the “Kafantayeni Resentencing Project” was
transformative. Stakeholder meetings were held, plans were made, and things
seemed to be moving forward. The clinic helped organize a series of trainings for
lawyers, judges, paralegals, prison officers, and mental health workers on the nature
and relevance of mitigating evidence to capital sentencing decisions. Working with
the London-based NGO Reprieve and PASI, the clinic coordinated investigations
into the life history of each prisoner. We brought in mental health experts from the
United States and South Africa to assess over twenty-five prisoners who seemed to
be mentally ill or intellectually disabled. Working closely with Malawian attorneys
and international legal fellows funded by Reprieve, clinic students drafted legal
arguments in support of reduced sentences in dozens of cases.
We prioritized the cases of the most vulnerable prisoners, including those
who were sick, elderly, or very youthful at the time of the offense for which they
were sentenced to death. After investigation, we discovered that a number of
prisoners were juveniles at the time of the offense—a fact that should have
exempted them from the death penalty altogether. Others were innocent of the
crimes for which they had been convicted. Many had caused the death of another
human being, but under circumstances that mitigated the severity of the offense.
For example, several had been condemned to die for killing persons who had
attacked their loved ones.
In preparing for the resentencing process, the Malawi judiciary adopted
several innovative procedures to expedite the hearings. For example, all of the
hearings were held in Zomba, the former colonial capital where the maximum
90

See HAMMERGREN, supra note 13, at 223.
See Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge 9-10
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working Paper No. 34, 2003) (“[A]id providers
should not presume change will naturally occur once institutions are introduced to the right way of
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security prison was located. The courts agreed to accept evidence by affidavit,
rather than requiring the defense to bring in live witnesses—a concession that made
it possible to conduct the hearings within the budget approved by Tilitonse. A strike
by the judiciary support staff derailed the project in late 2014, as the courts closed
down completely for two months.92 But in February 2015, the courts finally began
to hold the first hearings.93
The first prisoners were released in February 2015. The news of their release
traveled quickly through the prison. Prison officers reported that as the prisoners
began to hope that their sentences would be reduced, their behavior improved. The
prison officers themselves became the strongest supporters of the resentencing
project. They provided affidavits attesting to the good behavior of nearly every
prisoner and celebrated with us at the news of each release. They informed us when
prisoners were mentally or physically unwell. Their concern for the prisoners
contrasted starkly with the hostility and distrust that marks relations between prison
guards and prisoners in the United States.94
By September 2018, the courts had conducted resentencing hearings in all
but a handful of cases. The great majority of prisoners received dramatically
reduced sentences with the prospect of early release.95 As of this writing, 138
prisoners have been released, and nineteen more have been given determinate
sentences.96 Only one prisoner received a life sentence, and none received a death
sentence. Less than ten prisoners are still awaiting resentencing.
The project is viewed by many as a tremendous success. 97 Innocent people
have been freed as a result of our work, as well as many others who did not deserve
to remain in prison. I am proud of the role the clinic has played in its development
and implementation. But at the same time, the justice system’s dependence on
donor support to implement a binding legal judgment is deeply troubling.
There is a voluminous literature in the field of development economics and
political science that discusses the paradox of foreign aid.98 Most of the literature
92

George Mkondiwa Confirms that Judiciary Strike Over, Malawi Courts Open Today,MARAVI
POST (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.maravipost.com/george-mkondiwa-confirms-that-judiciary-strikeover-malawi-courts-open-today.
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Daniel Mababa, Courts Begin Re-Sentencing of Death Row Prisoners, ZODIAK ONLINE (Feb. 10,
2015), https://zodiakmalawi.com/top-stories/courts-begin-re-sentencing-of-death-row-prisoners.
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While it would be naïve to believe that Malawian prison officers are unfailingly kind and
courteous, we have received remarkably few reports from prisoners of serious violence within
Zomba prison.
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The death sentences of approximately 150 prisoners had been commuted to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole by presidential decree. Unquestionably, all would have died in
prison had it not been for the project.
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See Sandra Babcock, Malawian Prisoner Released After Twelve Years on Death Row, DEATH
PENALTY WORLDWIDE (June 28, 2017), http://blog.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/2017/06/malawianprisoner-released-after-twelve-years-on-death-row.html.
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See The Death Penalty Does Not Work; Politicians Should Listen, WEEKEND NATION, June 10,
2018, at 7; Justin K. Dzonzi, The Work of the Malawi Human Rights Commission on the Death
Penalty, presented at the 6th World International Congress on the Death Penalty (June 23, 2016)
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THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE GOOD (2006); Moss, Pettersson & van de Walle,
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discusses the failure of foreign aid programs to achieve their desired objectives;
namely, economic growth. Relatively little scholarship has focused on the effects
of development aid on the justice sector.99 This lack of scholarly attention is in part
attributable to the relatively low level of international aid devoted to the justice
sector in comparison to the health, environmental, educational, transport,
communication and agricultural sectors.100 In addition, many legal scholars lack the
practical experience and time to reflect on the complex array of factors that affect
the outcomes of rule-of-law projects.101
I question the relevance of certain aspects of the development aid paradigm
to our clinic work. We are not a donor agency like the World Bank or IMF, and our
work should not be judged by the same standards. Moreover, our clinic provides
client-centered legal services, and I’m resistant to the idea that our work should be
judged by our success or failure in achieving institutional reform. This perspective
is consistent with the perspective of many other international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs) and institutions that engage in human rights advocacy, who
tend not to conceptualize their projects as a form of development aid.102
Nevertheless, some foreign aid agencies would view our Malawi project as falling
within the category of “law reform,”103 and it is worth reflecting on whether our
clinic’s engagement in Malawi has helped perpetuate a donor-driven, aiddependent culture.
Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle have observed that large aid flows can
reduce governmental accountability:104 “A reliance on aid as a substitute for local
resources means the flow of revenues to the state is not affected by government
efficiency, so there will be a tendency for governments to underinvest in
developmental capacity.”105 The authors describe this as a “moral hazard” effect of
aid dependence.106 A related critique posits that aid reduces a government’s
incentive to adopt good policies and reform inefficient institutions.107 A number of
scholars have found that governments actually spend less on certain sectors when
donor funding is made available, particularly when the donor’s priorities are not
supra note 68; James Ferguson, THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: “DEVELOPMENT,”
DEPOLITICIZATION, AND BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO (1990).
99
One notable exception is Linn Hammergren’s book on the effectiveness of aid to the justice sector.
See Hammergren, supra note 13; Carothers, supra note 91.
100
See Hammergren, supra note 13, at 3, 9 (“[A]s compared to other assistance areas, donors’
investments in justice are not large”).
101
Carothers, supra note 91, at 13 (“[T]his kind of research is eminently applied in nature and thus
tends not to attract scholars, who have few professional incentives to tackle questions that arise from
and relate to aid activities. Remarkably little writing has come out of the academy about the
burgeoning field of rule-of-law promotion in the last twenty years. And only a small part of that
existing literature is written by scholars who have had significant contact with actual aid programs.).
102
See INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS. POLICY, LOCAL PERSPECTIVES: FOREIGN AID TO THE
JUSTICE SECTOR 19 (2000) (noting that donors tended to treat development aid and human rights as
separate issues).
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See generally Hammergren, supra note 13, at 7-8.
104
Moss, Pettersson & van de Walle, supra note 68, at 269.
105
Id.
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Id. at 268.
107
See Peter S. Heller & Sanjeev Gupta, Challenges in Expanding Development Assistance, 20 (IMF
Policy Discussion Paper, Working Paper No. 02/5, 2002).
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shared by the recipient government.108 This is sometimes referred to as the
“fungibility” of aid.109
In the context of our clinic’s work, it could easily be argued that the influx
of external funding for the Kafantayeni Resentencing Project removed any
incentive for the state to build institutional capacity to implement the Kafantayeni
judgment. Put differently, our project absolved the government of its responsibility
to allocate necessary funding to the justice sector that would enable the courts, legal
aid, and the prosecution to meet international fair trial standards in death penalty
cases. Moreover, our project arguably allowed the government to escape
accountability for its failure to comply with the rule of law.
Although the resources that our clinic has brought to the Malawian justice
sector may have provided a disincentive for the state to allocate funding for
resentencing hearings, the likelihood that the government would have devoted the
necessary resources to securing justice for murder convicts was exceedingly
remote.110 For this reason, the concerns raised by development economists over the
fungibility of aid are largely inapplicable.111 In other words, the funding we
obtained for the resentencing hearings likely had no effect on budgetary allocations
for this purpose, since no allocations were forthcoming. Improving access to justice
for prisoners is never high on any government’s priority list, particularly in a
country whose population is constantly at risk of famine and where HIV prevalence
rates stand at 9.2% of the adult population.112 If we had stood by and waited for the
justice sector to find its own solution, dozens of men and women—some of them
wrongly convicted of crimes they did not commit—would have died in prison.113
As it stands, 10 prisoners died between 2009 and the start of resentencing hearings
in 2015.
108

See Marwa Farag et. al, Does Funding from Donors Displace Government Spending for Health
in Developing Countries?, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1045, 1052 (2009).
109
See id.; Dominic van de Walle & Ren Mu, Fungibility and the Flypaper Effect of Project Aid:
Micro-Evidence for Vietnam, 84 J. DEV. ECON. 667, 668 (2007) (“[M]ost economists appear to think
that fungibility is the norm, while most aid donors behave as though there is no fungibility.”); Kelly
Jones, Moving Money: Aid Fungibility in Africa, SAIS REV. INT’L AFF., Summer–Fall 2005, at 167,
167–69; Farag, et al., supra note 108, at 1046. (“(1) [A]t the macro level (how do changes in total
foreign aid for development affect total public expenditures?); (2) at the sector or meso level (how
does donor aid for one sector(s) affect public expenditures for this sector?); and (3) at the micro
(within-sector) level (how does aid for an intervention within one sector affect public spending for
this intervention?)”).
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See KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 65 (“[T]he justice sector is a low priority area for
government”) (citing MALAWI JUDICIARY, MALAWI JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 31
(2003)).
111
See INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS. POLICY, supra note 102, at 32–33.
112
Malawi: HIV and AIDS Overview, UN AIDS, http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/
countries/malawi (last visited May 31, 2018).
113
Amnesty International reported that more than 180 people died in Malawian prisons in 2004 and
that “[m]any of the deaths were HIV-related; others were the result of preventable illnesses caused
or exacerbated by overcrowding, poor diet, unsanitary conditions and medical neglect.” Amnesty
International, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT – 2005: MALAWI (May 25, 2005),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/429b27ef11.html. In 2005, the New York Times reported that in
Zomba prison, which houses death row, one out of every 20 prisoners died each year. Wines, supra
note 2.
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The response to this argument, however, is that governments should be free
to make these judgments for themselves.114 If a government decides that its
resources should go toward reducing food insecurity and implementing measures
to prevent malaria infection in children, human rights advocates have no right to
meddle in those decisions.115 Similarly, if the judiciary prioritizes the hearing of
civil disputes and homicide trials over the resentencing of prisoners convicted many
years ago, that is a decision of theirs alone.116
The international donor community has been harshly criticized for setting
priorities without regard to local concerns.117 A number of scholars have framed
the debate over priority setting as a question of legitimacy.118 Kapiriri lists a number
of factors that undermine the legitimacy of donors’ tendency to set priorities
without local input:
(i) [M]ost of these organizations are not elected or appointed by the host
countries, (ii) they are not representative of the general population they
seek to serve, (iii) in most cases, they lack any legal frameworks for their
activities and (iv) sometimes they may not conform to or respect the local
values and norms.119

Both Kapiriri and Lister conclude that legitimacy is directly related to the degree
of “representativeness” of the institution engaged in strategic decision-making.120
In the field of NGO advocacy, this “relates to the right to represent and the consent
of the represented.”121
Here again, Kapiri and Lister’s challenge seems only marginally relevant to
our clinic work on behalf of individual clients. The prisoners affected by the
Kafantayeni judgment gave us their unconditional consent to represent their
interests (in conjunction with local lawyers). But if we view the Kafantayeni
Resentencing Project as a law reform effort anchored to a larger objective of
facilitating prisoners’ access to the courts, our intervention is more problematic. By
writing a successful grant proposal for the resentencing hearings, our clinic diverted

INT’L COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS. POL’Y, supra note 102, at 23.
For example, in 2013 the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food praised Malawi’s
government for having allocated ten percent of its national budget to agriculture, a key step in the
fight against food insecurity. See De Schutter, supra note 8, at 4.
116
On the other hand, some authors argue that is precisely in those areas where the government’s
commitment to reform is weakest that international donors should focus their attention (and
funds). INT’L COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS. POL’Y, supra note 102, at 28–29. See also Easterly, supra
note 98.
117
INT’L COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS. POL’Y, supra note 102, at 70–71, 75; Lydia Kapiriri et al., Is CostEffectiveness Analysis Preferred to Severity of Disease as the Main Guiding Principle in Priority
Setting in Resource Poor Settings? The Case of Uganda, 2 COST EFFECTIVENESS & RESOURCE
ALLOCATION 1 (2004).
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See, e.g., Sarah Lister, NGO Legitimacy: Technical Issue or Social Construct?, 23 CRITIQUE
ANTHROPOLOGY 175 (2003); See infra note 122, at 67; Hugo Slim, By Whose Authority? The
Legitimacy and Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations, INT’L COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS.
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See infra note 122, at 68–69.
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Lister, supra note 118, at 177.
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Id.; see also Slim, supra note 118.
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human resources from other legal disputes whose resolution may now be
postponed.122
The tradeoff described above is inherent in any type of legal advocacy.
What makes it more fraught, in the context of international human rights fieldwork,
is that we are working within a system that is not our own. As an American lawyer
working in Malawi, I have no stake in the justice sector. Why should my priorities
matter? I care about prisoners’ rights, and am deeply opposed to the death penalty—
passions that have fueled many years of litigation in the United States, where I take
particular glee in foiling prosecutors’ efforts to have my clients killed as
expeditiously as possible. But in Malawi, it’s different. In part, I think, it’s because
Malawi’s legal system truly is struggling to survive. When lawyers say that they
can’t visit their clients, it’s often because their office only has one car, and it has a
broken axle. The salaries of legal aid lawyers are not high enough for them to own
their own cars and pay for their own fuel. The budget constraints are real.
Alex de Waal’s critique of international humanitarian aid agencies focuses
on the problem of accountability in a context that may be more directly relevant to
the work of human rights clinics. A social anthropologist and human rights
researcher, he has challenged the lack of accountability among what he terms the
“humanitarian international.”123 According to de Waal, “the expansion of
internationalized humanitarianism in the 1980s and 1990s reflects a retreat from
accountability, akin to the dominance of neo-liberalism.”124 This “retreat from
accountability” has two dimensions. As an initial matter, the internationalization of
responsibility for humanitarian crises has reduced the accountability of local
governments by shifting power to a vast array of non-governmental and intergovernmental agencies engaged in the fight against famine. 125 At the same time,
this network of international organizations has no more than a “vague and easily
evaded moral responsibility—nothing more than an aspiration” to accomplish their
declared objectives. Moreover, they cannot be “called to account” for their
failures.126 “Moral outrage plus technical proficiency does not equal accountability
for results.”127
Granted, de Waal’s venom is directed primarily at the vast bureaucracies of
the United Nations and large NGOs involved in humanitarian crises. But his
appraisal of their shortcomings is undoubtedly relevant to NGOs and clinics
engaged in human rights advocacy, especially since human rights clinics are a
component of an increasingly active and well-financed international human rights
movement. Clinics may choose their international projects based, in part, on the
interests of their students and the priorities of their professors. They operate with
little external scrutiny. If they deem a project to be unsatisfactory—either because
it doesn’t meet the pedagogical goals of the professor, or for a host of other
122
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reasons—the clinic may simply withdraw from the country. This, of course, is
overly simplistic. Most clinical professors are acutely sensitive to the importance
of responding to local needs and seek to avoid imposing their own agendas on
partners in foreign countries. But there is a core truth to de Waal’s charge that we
lack accountability for our actions.
Scholars within the human rights movement have leveled similar charges of
illegitimacy and inappropriate priority setting against the human rights movement
as a whole.128 As put by Makau Wa Mutua:
[O]ften, Northern activists with little familiarity with the continent
descend on the capital city, interrogate local activists and a few victims
and fly back to the West to release and publicize their report. There is little
continuing contact with local groups and individuals until the next
mission. In the meantime, the experts from the North influence funding
trends and choices and determine the issues and groups deserving of
support. Usually, the advice to funders—most of whom cannot
independently verify the information—strengthens the hand of the
advisors and leaves them in a superior position against their African
counterparts. This model represents the biggest long-term threat to the
relationship between African activists and their friends in the North.129

Other scholars have criticized human rights clinics in particular for monopolizing
control over strategic decisions and exacerbating power imbalances between
institutions located in the global north and their counterparts in the global south.130
These are all valid critiques. My clinic has tried to avoid the pitfalls
described by de Waal and Mutua by creating long-term, collaborative relationships
with local partners on the ground. Over the course of the last twelve years, we have
painstakingly built relationships with civil society organizations, prosecutors,
defense lawyers, judges, law professors, and magistrates. We take an interest in the
challenges they face and try to assist where we can. By visiting time and again, we
have developed a deep appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of the
Malawian justice sector. With regard to the Kafantayeni project, our Malawian
partners controlled the funding and decision-making—even though the clinic
coordinated much of the legal work along with an able crew of volunteer lawyers
from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States and Australia. In
Malawi, more than 40 judges, 20 paralegals, 10 prosecutors and 20 defense lawyers
participated in the resentencing hearings and/or attended training workshops on the
investigation, presentation, and consideration of mitigating evidence in capital
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cases.131 While the clinic gave the project a much-needed push to get off the ground,
the Kafantayeni project now has broad support from a wide range of stakeholders.
Nevertheless, the clinic cannot avoid entirely the unequal power dynamics
inherent in any north-south collaboration. One of my students, reflecting on our
Malawi work in the context of Mutua’s critique,132 observed:
What would happen, for example, if [the clinic] was not involved in
assisting the prisoners in Malawi to help alleviate prison overcrowding?
Would our clients continue to languish in jail forever, or would the
overcrowding conditions eventually stimulate a pooling of resources in
Malawi to educate and train more lawyers in order to have a functional
judicial system? This is a difficult question, and the most frequent answer,
at least within the international human rights community, raises the specter
of the Western “savior” and places [the clinic] squarely in that role –
completely incapacitated by their inferior economic and societal
structures, Malawi prisoners and their attorneys are dependent on [the
clinic] to provide the knowledge, manpower, and “civilized”
determination to assess individual defendants’ unique circumstances when
meting out punishment. Clearly, that is an oversimplification of the
situation, but the savior-dynamic is certainly present to some effect.133

This is an entirely valid critique, and one that is difficult to refute. From a
pedagogical perspective, it is essential to raise these questions with students, and to
explore how we can best mitigate the risk. From a tactical perspective, it compels
careful, ongoing consultation with our partners to build a truly collaborative
relationship—one that recognizes that each partner brings value and expertise to
the table.134
C. The Dangers of Cultural Incompetence
“Cultural competency” is a term that has garnered substantial attention
within the clinical community over the last few decades. The notion of cultural
competence encompasses a wide skill-set, including self-reflection and awareness
of existing biases, identification of cultural differences, and the development of
131

Most experts on development aid are skeptical that judicial training serves to promote judicial
reform. See Carothers, supra note 91, at 12. In the Kafantayeni Project, however, we combined
training with litigation in which judges presided over actual cases that resembled the hypothetical
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tools to bridge the gap between lawyers and clients from diverse racial, ethnic, and
socio-economic origins.135 Educators and scholars have emphasized the importance
of training culturally competent lawyers—that is, lawyers prepared to recognize
and navigate cultural barriers with sensitivity and compassion.136 Workshops on
teaching cultural competency are a standard feature at clinical education
conferences.
In the context of international human rights advocacy, the notion of cultural
competency is often linked to clinical work on behalf of foreign-born populations,
including field work in foreign countries.137 As Janus and Smythe have observed,
“the ability to effectively navigate culture is at the core of effective human rights
advocacy.”138 This is undeniably true, but knowledge of its truth does not always
translate into effective cross-cultural lawyering.
Over the years, my clinic developed close, collaborative relationships with
a number of Malawian partners. Everything we do on the ground is linked to a local
partner. My students interview prisoners alongside Malawian law students; they
travel to villages to interview prisoners’ family members with Malawian paralegals;
and they work hand-in-hand with Malawian legal aid lawyers to draft legal
arguments on behalf of prisoners seeking sentence reductions on appeal. Students
have also helped lead human rights training workshops in partnership with our
Malawian colleagues. These experiences have helped to build our knowledge of
Malawian legal system.
I have learned and applied many superficial lessons about Malawian culture
in our work with local partners. Before every meeting, I remind myself to sit back
in my chair, to assume the laid-back rhythm of Malawian conversations, and to
listen between the lines. I have learned that Malawians dislike saying “no” when
135
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they disagree, so I am careful to inquire about the challenges they foresee in any
particular course of action. At the same time, my students and I continually struggle
to understand and respond appropriately to aspects of Malawi’s complex and
diverse local culture. Kennedy describes this phenomenon in his 1985 essay,
Spring Break, where he evokes “the activist’s sense of not knowing what things
mean or where they are going in human rights work . . . and the ways our inability
to know what [is] intrusive . . . [leaves] us confused about our connections and
responsibilities.”139
The vignette that I am about to relate provides the starkest example of how
cultural incompetence can not only hamper advocacy goals but can also endanger
the safety of both students and our local partners.
In March 2013, prior to the start of the Kafantayeni resentencing hearings,
my clinic was engaged in appellate advocacy on behalf of a small number of
prisoners who had been sentenced to death. None of the prisoners were represented
on appeal. I proposed to the Chief Legal Aid Advocate that my students interview
the prisoners, review their case files, identify potential legal arguments, and draft
the appellate briefs. One of the prisoners we identified was a man named Gift
Nkwenda.140 When I first interviewed him in 2009, I noticed that he was disheveled
and unkempt. He had never been to school and had difficulty spelling his name.
Although we could only communicate through an interpreter, I thought he could be
intellectually disabled.
Gift had been convicted of a particularly violent offense. In Malawi, most
homicides are the result of spontaneous conflicts fueled by alcohol. The use of guns
is exceedingly rare, and many deaths could be avoided if Malawi’s villages had
access to decent medical care. Gift, however, had been convicted of killing his nineyear-old niece. Her dismembered body was still in his hut when the police came
looking for her. It was the type of crime that immediately gave rise to suspicions
that Gift was very mentally ill. Yet we had no information about his life prior to his
arrest, since his trial lawyer had failed to conduct any investigation. His mental
status was key to our efforts to identify potential legal arguments on appeal, since
international law prohibits the execution of individuals with severe mental illnesses
or intellectual disabilities.141
The students and I discussed the case with the PASI paralegals. We decided
that a team of two students and two paralegals would visit his village and interview
his parents to obtain information about his life history. We developed a
questionnaire that explored issues of poverty, health, his mother’s pregnancy, and
family history of mental illness. The team set out for the village, while I traveled to
a nearby city to give a lecture on mitigating evidence to Malawian law students.
On my way back from the lecture, one of my students called. She sounded
breathless and agitated. She explained that they had just left the village, and that
the interviews had not gone well. This is what she told me:
139
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The team arrived at the village, and after asking around, were able to
identify Gift’s family home on the outskirts of the village. His parents were poor,
even by Malawian standards. While many Malawian families have a small stool for
honored guests, Gift’s parents had no furniture whatsoever. The team sat on the
packed dirt floor. The students and paralegals explained the purpose of their visit,
and Gift’s parents said that they would be happy to share whatever information
would be helpful.
Soon after they began the interviews, the team noticed that village children
had begun to gather around the edges of the dirt yard where the students were
conducting the interviews. This in itself was not uncommon, but nonetheless the
paralegals tried to shoo them away to maintain as much privacy as possible. Shortly
thereafter, some women arrived, and sat down within a few yards of where the
students were speaking to Gift’s parents. The paralegals could not persuade them
to leave. The students noticed that there was some activity in the fields surrounding
the house. There was also some shouting, but they didn’t speak Chichewa and
couldn’t understand what was being said.
Gift’s parents had begun to share important information relating to Gift’s
childhood. They explained that he had never been to school. He had worked to help
his family by collecting firewood and catching mice, which the family would make
into a stew to supplement their meager diet. He had a hard time making friends. His
brother was severely developmentally delayed.
Suddenly, the students were interrupted in their work by the arrival of the
village chief. She was obviously deeply disturbed by their presence. She demanded
to know why the students were talking to “her people” without having first sought
her permission. She told them they had to leave.
At the same time, men and women had begun to gather around the team’s
car. Some of the men, just returning from their fields, carried machetes. To the
students, they seemed hostile. The village chief cleared a way through the crowd.
The students and paralegals squeezed into their car with the village chief, and their
visibly riled driver slowly backed out. The crowd parted, and they made their way
to the chief’s home. Once they were away from suspicious onlookers, the chief
explained that the villagers did not understand the purpose of the team’s visit. They
feared the team was working to free Gift, and that he would be released back into
their community.
The chief further explained that if the paralegal/student team had come to
her first, she could have taken steps to ensure their safety and facilitate the
interviews with Gift’s family. She would have brought the family members to her
home, where students could interview them in privacy. In bypassing this step, the
paralegal/student team had created a potentially volatile situation.
In the end, no one was harmed—although my students were shaken by the
experience. For my part, it was a painful lesson in the limits of my own cultural
competency. I relied on the presence and local knowledge of the paralegals to
ensure my students’ safety, but failed to discuss with them just how villagers might
react to the students’ visit. Similarly, we failed to discuss what measures to take to
mitigate any risk. We agreed that in all future visits to villages, we would always
meet first with the village chief. We also agreed that in most cases, the crimes
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committed would not arouse the same degree of community outrage. Nevertheless,
we refrained from conducting any additional investigation during the trip.
In retrospect, I think it was highly unlikely that the students would have
been harmed by the villagers. On the other hand, after eight years of work in
Malawi, I now have a much greater appreciation of the dangers of mob violence. In
rural areas, mob violence is not an uncommon response to crime.142 Thieves and
suspected witches have been beaten to death, and some of the prisoners our clinic
has defended were convicted of similar crimes. Even accidental injuries can spark
mob violence; for example, I have repeatedly been instructed that if I were ever to
injure a pedestrian in a road accident, I should not stop, but should instead drive
straight to the closest police station. Once, when I was driving with my students in
southern Malawi, we saw a truck hit a woman on her bike. The truck stopped, as
did we, to see if we could offer any aid. As I was offering to drive the victim to the
hospital, people began pouring out of their shops and homes and running toward
the truck. I saw them pull open the passenger-side door, at which point I got back
in the car and quickly left the scene.143
I still send students into villages to conduct mitigation investigation, but
only after taking a number of precautions. First, we obtain as much information as
possible about the nature of the crime, when it occurred, the location of the victim’s
family, and the degree of hostility between the defendant’s and victim’s families.
Often, the paralegals will contact the village chief, as well as regional traditional
authorities, in advance of their visit. Second, the students are always accompanied
by a team of at least two paralegals. Third, they will always visit the chief in person
before conducting any interviews. Finally, I no longer allow the students to conduct
investigations in recent cases involving highly aggravated homicides. After
implementing these protocols, we have not had any further problems, and the
students often say that the village mitigation investigation is the most rewarding
part of our Malawi field work.
III. THE MALAWI PROJECT: A MODEL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY?
Over the last two decades, the number of international human rights clinics
at U.S. law schools has grown exponentially. As Hurwitz and others have
documented, the first human rights clinics came into existence in the late 1980s.144
As of 2011, there were 45 international human rights clinics at 42 law schools in
the U.S. and Canada,145 including 13 out of the top 15 U.S. law schools in the
142
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rankings provided by U.S. News and World Report.146 In addition, there are many
clinical programs that do not define themselves as human rights clinics nonetheless
engage in international human rights advocacy.147
Human rights clinicians have adopted diverse approaches to clinic project
selection.148 Many early clinics followed the model of human rights monitoring and
reporting pioneered by organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International.149 Clinics would partner with international or local non-governmental
organizations to expose human rights violations through investigation, reportwriting, and media advocacy.150 Other clinics focused on the representation of
individuals seeking asylum, highlighting human rights abuses in the clients’ home
countries in an effort to persuade immigration courts that they were entitled to
refugee status under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.151 Still others
filed lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute to seek redress for human rights
violations perpetrated against foreign nationals residing in the United States.152
Today, human rights clinics are engaged in a wide spectrum of projects and
cases both in the United States and abroad, to the extent that it is no longer possible
to capture their work in a few short sentences.153 As human rights clinics have
become increasingly commonplace, critiques of their work have inevitably
emerged. On the one hand, conservative scholars such as Eric Posner have
questioned the effectiveness and appropriateness of human rights clinics.154 On the
other, progressive scholars have accused clinics of perpetuating the “dynamics of
domination and subordination” that have long characterized relations between
international institutions and local actors in the global south.155
Human rights clinicians have also begun to engage in an internal dialogue
about the merits of different approaches to international clinical work. Clinicians
are increasingly questioning the value of short-term projects in which clinic
students “parachute in” to a country with little consideration for the long-term
consequences of their engagement.156 As Bonilla has observed, “these types of
clinical projects are sustained by a questionable attitude rooted in the beliefs that
146

Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://grad-schools.usnews.
rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings.
147
For example, my colleague Angela Cornell runs a labor law clinic in which she has taken students
to Cambodia to investigate unsafe working conditions.
148
See, supra note 144, at 540 .
149
See Deena Hurwitz, Remarks by Deena R. Hurwitz, 104 PROC. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L.) 95, 96 (2010).
150
See Sarah H. Paoletti, Finding the Pearls When the World is Your Oyster: Case and Project
Selection in Clinic Design, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 423, 437 (2013).
151
See id. at 459-60.
152
See Arturo J. Carrillo, Bringing International Law Home: The Innovative Role of Human Rights
Clinics in the Transnational Legal Process, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527, 568-69 (2004);
Hurwitz supra note 149, at 96.
153
The wide-ranging scope of this work has been described in recent articles by Paoletti and
Bettinger-Lopez et. al. See Paoletti, supra note 150, at 434-35, 437; Bettinger-Lopez, et. al., supra
note 49, at 363.
154
Eric A. Posner, The Human Rights Charade, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 17, 2014).
155
See Bonilla, supra n. 130.
156
See id. at 22–23; Bettinger-Lopez et. al., supra note 49, at 363; Jeena Shah, Rebellious Lawyering
in Big Case Clinics, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 775, 791 (2017).

81

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[2019

the legal academia of the Global North is so solid that it can produce knowledge
after a tangential direct contact with the reality being studied and that a week or
two is enough time within which to determine what the problems are, how to
evaluate them and how to fix them.”157
Ferguson echoes Bonilla’s critique, albeit in the contact of foreign
development aid. In The Anti-Politics Machine, Ferguson recounts his surprise in
learning that a development consultant was to arrive in Zimbabwe with no prior
experience in the region.158 When he questioned the qualifications of the consultant,
he was assured that “he knows development.”159 Ferguson observes that this sort of
“free-floating” expertise, “untied to any specific context,” is characteristic of many
development programs.160 In much the same way, a human rights clinic’s expertise
in the field of human rights, when untethered to specific knowledge about a region,
falls short of the contextualized knowledge essential for effective analysis and
advocacy.161
These critiques echo those of scholars immersed in the fields of “law and
development” and “justice reform.”162 Yet, few clinicians have integrated this
scholarship into their teaching and writing. Human rights clinicians do not typically
view themselves as being part of donor agencies—myself included. But our local
partners may well view us through the prism of their previous relationships with
donor agencies. Our work is also subject to many of the same pitfalls that beset
donor/partner relations. Linn Hammergen, a prominent international expert in the
field of justice reform, explains that many efforts at justice reform fail because of
conflicting agendas between donors and their local counterparts.163 “Doing this,”
she emphasizes, “requires understanding the perspectives on the other side.”164
Many human rights clinicians can also attest that signing an MOU with a local
partner defining the parameters of their collaboration does not guarantee that both
sides will approach the project with the same objectives. Similarly, consultants
working with donor agencies:
often arrive at the project site only to discover that their counterparts have
little idea of what is intended, what their presumed role is, or what this
implies for their usual activities. Whoever agreed to the program may be
157
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located organizationally far away from the targeted institutions, may have
already left his or her position, or may have understood that agreement as
only letting the donors spend their own funds on whatever they proposed
to do. This happens in all areas of donor assistance, but is more common
in justice projects . . . .165

To avoid such misunderstandings, external consultants—like human rights
clinics—must take the necessary time to build cooperation, consensus, and
commitment with local partners—a step that most donors short-circuit.166
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of short-term projects, relatively few
clinics have opted to limit their work to sustained engagements with a small number
of partners in a single country. The reasons for this merit further exploration. Many
clinicians have an understandable desire to expose their students to a variety of
projects in different substantive issue areas. In specializing in one project or
country, clinicians may be worried about “[r]isking [b]readth for [d]epth.”167 I have
worried at times that my clinic may not attract the same numbers of students if I
don’t provide a range of projects on different issues affecting different countries.
Nevertheless, there is much to be gained by a limited geographic focus.
Hammergren notes that the potential for most clinics to effect long-term change is
“severely limited” because they “frequently know little about the circumstances in
which they propose to work.”168 She notes that clinics “working off a long history
in a single country or region” are likely to be more effective.169
Since student interest is a factor in maintaining a stable of diverse clinic
projects, it is worth asking whether the Malawi model is attractive to students, and
whether their engagement in a long-term project offers an experience that is
fundamentally different from what they would receive in a semester-long project.
This is, of course, is impossible to gauge with any objective measure. Short-term
projects can be immensely satisfying for students, particularly when students can
see the project through to its conclusion during the course of a single semester.
Some of my students were lucky enough to witness the release of a prisoner whose
case they had worked on—and this sort of positive “closure” is extremely
rewarding. Early in the project, one student ended her journal with the following
note:
The morning that we received notice that 11 of the prisoners were being
recommended for immediate release after negotiations between the
defense and the DPP, and the fact that they had relied so heavily on the
factors identified through our work, was one of the most gratifying and
proud moments of my life.170
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Another student, who had expressed doubt about the significance of her
contribution to the project, expressed her happiness once her “client” was released
from prison:
I came back from our trip to Malawi feeling . . . frustrated that . . . given
the short length of the trip, we did not accomplish as much as I had initially
thought we would . . . . Though I did form more of a personal connection
to the work by meeting some of the prisoners, I was still unsure of how to
measure my contribution to the project without having yet seen any
tangible results.
It was thus extremely exciting (and great timing!) that [my client] was
released a week after we got back. I was happy because I truly believed
he should not be imprisoned for what he did, and also because I could
finally point to a tangible outcome that I worked to produce . . . . .171

Another student expressed her gratitude for all of those who had worked on the
project for years before her, while acknowledging the unique gratification that
comes from seeing actual “results” in a project:
I have to admit, I feel extremely lucky to be working at this stage of the
Malawi project (i.e. results stage) . . . . As I work on these submissions, I
see the relentlessness and hard work in every prepared document (i.e. case
summaries, prisoner interviews, mitigating factors memo) . . . I feel
extremely honored to be writing a submission that encapsulates the hard
work of the other individuals who have worked on the prisoner’s behalf.172

While witnessing a client’s release from prison is a rare pleasure, students
have also discussed the value of litigating cases within Malawi’s criminal justice
system to fully grasp the barriers to justice there. One student remarked:
It was also very helpful to see why exactly getting things done in Malawi
is difficult. It is easy to look at the tasks to be done through the lens of our
limited experience in the US and say “it should be easy- why can’t the
Malawian’s get it together?” But experiencing the difficulties in-country
made it much more difficult to level that criticism. Cars get stuck in the
mud, rides have to be arranged to economize on fuel, it is difficult to travel
after dark, you have to focus on the availability of resources we take for
granted: paper, internet, email-sharing. I think understanding these very
basic constraints is incredibly important when making requests of local
partners. That’s why I value the chance to see it. . . .173

In reviewing my students’ journals over the years, there is often little to
indicate that the length and depth of our engagement in Malawi affected their own
subjective experience. There are some exceptions, however. One student described
a moment in the trip when she was thanked by a client’s mother for helping secure
his release:
As our eyes teared up together, I was overwhelmed by the sense of being

171

M.H., Student Journal (Fall 2015) (on file with Author).
B.B., Student Journal (April 27, 2015) (on file with Author).
173
A.K., Student Journal (Spring 2015) (on file with author) (emphasis in original).
172

84

Vol. 17:1]

Sandra L. Babcock

a part of something so much larger than myself. It was a wonderful
experience working in a clinic with other students who shared my desire
to do public-interest work, but in that moment, I was struck by how
humbling it was to be part of a much larger community of people I will
never meet who have all worked on the same project at various stages in
time . . . . This experience served as a profound reminder that victories
often only come after a series of small steps. It may be difficult to see
progress or measure success in the moment, but over time, the incremental
efforts of many different people can produce significant results.174

Many of my students have likewise commented on the importance of relationship
building. One student observed:
I was struck by how willing the Malawians seemed to be about including
us in their work. I think I expected our purpose or motive to be questioned
more than it was. . . . That’s one important thing I took away from the
whole trip – the importance of building relationships doing this kind of
work. Trust is not instant, especially across cultures.175

Another student, after describing the endless meetings we had attended with local
partners, remarked: “This project proved just how important it is to establish solid
relationships within the country in which you want to work.”176 Another student
similarly observed: “[G]etting to see how a relationship with local partners in a
foreign country is built is, I think, one of the more valuable lessons I’m learning
from the Malawi project.”177 Yet another stated: “There were many lessons that I
took from Malawi, but two stood out: the importance of building relationships and
the importance of being creative while understanding the limitation of
resources.”178 And when I read the following journal entry I raised my fists in a
victory salute: “[T]he goal is ultimately to empower Malawi’s legal community to
create strategies and implement reforms on their own, rather than for American
lawyers to identify problems, swoop in to try to fix them, and then disappear
again.”179
My clinic students also derive great satisfaction from representing
individual clients. One student observed:
The case of Mr. Mtambo was a great opportunity to participate in a true
“human rights work” – I interviewed him; I interviewed his relatives; and
I contributed for a man to hopefully be released from prison. There is a
famous sentence in Judaism that says: "Whoever saves one life, saves the
world entire.” I know I didn’t save the world, but it definitely feels like I
made a difference; and it feels great.180

Another student, discussing our Malawi work in the context of Makau Mutua’s
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critique of human rights advocacy, observed:
We have individual clients with very specific problems that we actually
have the capacity to help in very substantive ways – i.e. winning their
release from prison or a reduction in their sentence. These goals seem to
be universally-recognized as important legal services to which efforts
defendants are entitled. And the value we are pursuing – fairness in
punishment for individuals convicted of crimes, and the right of accused
persons to present a defense – doesn’t seem to be so foreign that a nonWestern society would resist it.181

Another student reaffirmed how client representation solidified her commitment to
human rights work:
[R]eally the most important thing that clinic did for me, was to connect me
with clients, and to do so in a way that was really humanity-affirming. By
putting faces to names and images to locations, it really brought life and
depth to the causes that we’re working on.182

This focus on direct client representation is different from the approach
adopted by many early human rights clinics.183 For example, I have intentionally
refrained from engaging in systemic challenges to government policy. Over the
years that our clinic has been working in Malawi, we have consciously refrained
from publishing reports or taking any steps to expose the inadequacy of Malawi’s
justice sector. In the Malawian context, I believe that public “shaming” of the
country by highlighting its abysmal prison conditions or unfair trials would have
jeopardized the relationships that we worked so hard to build with government
officials, judges, and other justice sector stakeholders. These relationships were
crucial to obtaining the outcomes we sought for our clients. Moreover, given the
paucity of resources in Malawi, the traditional human rights approach of naming
and shaming184 would have been far less effective in achieving concrete results. By
forgoing such an approach, we have been able to work closely with judges,
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and non-governmental organizations to develop
creative strategies to address entrenched problems.185 As opposed to traditional

181

K.M., Student Journal (Oct. 5, 2010) (on file with author).
K.T., Student Journal (May 6, 2011) (on file with Author).
183
In her 2003 article on the growth of human rights clinics, Hurwitz asserts that “[i]nternational
human rights clinics are not a client-centered program. . . With human rights advocacy, the object
may be the articulation or clarification of a norm or set of standards, as much as, if not more often
than, representation of an aggrieved individual or group. . . . “Clients” are rarely individuals. . . .”
Since then, clinics have adopted diverse approaches to human rights clinical advocacy. Hurwitz,
supra n. 144, at 533.
184
As Bettinger Lopez, et. al, supra n. 49, at 341-42, explains, “naming and shaming” is the
approach embraced by many human rights organizations that engage in fact-finding “missions,”
then publicize the results of their research in the hope of bringing about change.
185
This approach seems consistent with Ferguson’s observation that “the most important
transformations, the changes that really matter, are not simply ‘introduced’ by benevolent
technocrats, but fought for and made through a complex process that involves not only states and
their agents, but all those with something at stake, all the diverse categories of people who craft their
everyday tactics of coping with, adapting to, and, in their various ways, resisting the established
182

86

Vol. 17:1]

Sandra L. Babcock

monitoring, which “identifies and announces abuses,” 186 we have engaged in direct
assistance to “propose solutions, and intervene directly in a country’s courts, police,
[and] prisons.”187 While I aim to provide training and support for lawyers and others
who may become agents for change in Malawi, our work is decidedly focused on
obtaining good outcomes for individuals through litigation and other forms of
advocacy. In this sense as well, it is vulnerable to critique.
Critical legal theorists Nitzah Berkovitch and Neve Gordon have argued:
While legal accomplishments can sometimes challenge social structures,
they are usually confined to mitigating the structure’s excesses (i.e.,
unintended results that constitute violations). Consequently, they often
also end up strengthening the system itself, since by correcting some of
the structure’s ‘dysfunctions,’ direct litigation helps produce the belief that
there is an impartial system that adjudicates between parties and corrects
wrongs. In this way it helps silence structural criticism.188

Applying this logic, our clinic has lost a critical opportunity to expose deeper
structural dysfunctions and governmental oppression of marginalized communities
(in this case, the prison population) by litigating on behalf of individuals.
This argument reminds me of some of the early debates over the value of
pro bono legal representation of prisoners facing execution in southern U.S. states.
Some advocates argued that lawyers should not absolve the state of responsibility
for ensuring prisoners were provided legal counsel on appeal.189 If prisoners were
executed without lawyers, it would only showcase the depravity of the justice
system and hasten the demise of the death penalty. 190 Moreover, states should be
forced to expend as many resources as possible on the death penalty, since the sheer
economic cost of capital punishment would deter lawmakers from expanding its
reach.191
Others believed (I among them) that the defense bar had a moral obligation
to try to prevent as many executions as possible, even if it allowed the state to
disingenuously argue that death row prisoners had been the beneficiaries of
rigorous procedural safeguards.192 The complexities of this debate are beyond the
scope of the present article. In a sense, it is not so different from the divide between
“cause” lawyering and client-centered lawyering.193 The latter prioritizes individual
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client objectives over those that benefit a larger movement. Where there is a conflict
between the cause and the client, the client always prevails.194
Drawing on the work of critical legal scholars such as Berkovitch and
Gordon, a group of clinical professors has challenged the clinical community to
integrate the lessons of the critical legal theory movement into project selection.195
In particular, they have suggested that human rights clinicians (and others) should
“choose projects, whether domestic or international, that go beyond the readily
apparent violations, beyond the moralistic, and which provide opportunities to
pressure hegemonic power and the consequences of the ideology of
neoliberalism.”196 While I embrace many of the arguments raised by the authors,
their suggested criteria for project selection strike me as overly ambitious.
Moreover, when clinics are engaging in social justice work in foreign countries, the
authors’ suggestion seems positively unwise. They cite with approval the
conclusions of Vasuki Nesiah and Alan Keenan that “strategies designed to
ameliorate human rights abuses are not likely to be effective unless they challenge
hegemonic ideologies and dominant political structures.”197 But as foreign
academics/lawyers/activists/students, are we really best placed to challenge
dominant political structures in a country that is not our own?198 Can’t we be more
effective in addressing discrete human rights violations that are within our power
to ameliorate? I wonder whether human rights clinicians risk falling into the trap
that has ensnared certain development aid agencies seeking to “transform” a
country’s legal system (or agricultural output, or provision of health care services).
In Easterly’s words:
As far as the “transformational” approach, its ambitions are certainly
understandable given the realities of poverty and suffering in Africa. But
these understandable ambitions seem to have created an intellectual bias
that exaggerates the importance and potential for benevolent action of
outside actors, as well as exaggerating Africa’s negatives and inability to
fix itself.199
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Easterly instead advocates for more modest projects that can lead to positive
outcomes.200 Experts in the field of justice reform have likewise urged donors to
focus on a “problem-oriented approach” to reform, rather than launching “grand
programs that at best build an ideal structure without necessarily fixing any specific
problems.”201 At the same time, Hammergren notes that “small ideas” need to be
grounded in a “larger vision (whether of the situation of a specific country or of the
justice reform enterprise writ large).”202
To be clear, I fully support critical legal scholars’ suggestion that clinicians
integrate into the clinic classroom a discussion of “the political-economic and
historical sources of human rights crises,” including neo-liberal economic policies
and colonialism.203 I have attempted to do that by inviting guest speakers in the
field of development economics, and by assigning provocative background
readings. I fear my efforts have fallen short in this regard, in part because of the
complexity of the issue and the need to cover so many other topics in the clinic
classroom. But when it comes to clinic project selection—particularly in the
African context—it seems somehow grandiose to imagine that my clinic could (or
should) “pressure hegemonic power” in the countries in which we work.204
Instead, I embrace projects that aim to promote the rights of individuals,
even where it is uncertain that our efforts will lead to major systemic reform. When
it comes to representing prisoners condemned to death, my aim is to prevent their
execution and persuade a court to reduce their sentence. That, in truth, is the
primary objective of our work in Malawi. If in the course of our litigation we are
able to create ground-breaking precedent or influence policy-makers to implement
meaningful reform, that is a bonus—but it is never the primary objective. As a
client-centered lawyer, my primary objective is to ameliorate any harm my client
has suffered as well as prevent future harm. On the other hand, I do look for
opportunities to create precedent and affect policy if (and only if) it is consistent
with my legal strategy on behalf of a client, and only after ensuring those efforts
will not have unintended consequences.205
Representing individual prisoners also clarifies many of the moral
ambiguities of working in foreign country. For example, in Kennedy’s account of
a human rights mission to Uruguay, he ruminates over his “standing” to investigate
and what they need to fix it.” William Easterly, Reinventing Foreign Aid 6 (William Easterly ed.,
2008).
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human rights violation in a foreign country. He asks, “what right had we to be there,
asking these questions? Why should the Punta Rieles prison open its files to us?”206
But as a lawyer representing a client, these questions are easily resolved. The prison
should open its files because we are representing a prisoner seeking recourse in the
courts. We have a right to ask questions because the answers are necessary to
properly defend our client.207 Further, by representing prisoners who have no access
to legal counsel, I avoid one of the more common challenges raised by project
selection; namely, whether clinicians should prioritize the pedagogical mission
over the potential for service to a community.208 Individual client representation
satisfies both criteria. Finally, as Haynes has argued, engaging in client-centered
human rights advocacy provides “infinite possibilities for teaching how, precisely,
a human rights advocate can and must confront questions of imperialism,
essentialism, reduction of a person or group to a state of Victim Subject, and the
unreflective advocate’s potential role in essentializing the very persons she is
purporting to help.”209
Another key feature of the Malawi project, which fulfills one of my criteria
for clinical project selection, is that it fills a much-needed gap in donor funding for
the justice sector. I have found that donors are generally reluctant to fund litigation
projects. On the other hand, they are much more receptive to training programs and
conferences designed to “build the capacity” of local police, prosecutors, judges or
defense attorneys. Yet as others have pointed out, the problem in many countries is
not a lack of knowledge, but a lack of resources. Prison officials that preside over
overcrowded penitentiaries where disease is rife and prisoners are denied adequate
food may be intimately familiar with the U.N. Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners.210 What they lack is the funding to construct additional dormitories
and purchase necessary supplies of nutritionally adequate food—funding that
international donors are unwilling to supply. Similarly, legal aid lawyers may know
how to prepare a defense, but without funding for investigators they have little
ability to track down witnesses and interview them. And without reliable access to
law libraries, electronic databases, printers, and paper, producing a well-researched
appellate brief becomes a daunting task.
My clinic has recently embarked on another long-term clinical project in
Tanzania. Building on the model we developed in Malawi, we are now partnering
with the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) in Dar Es Salaam, the UK-based
NGO Reprieve, the Pan-African Lawyers’ Union (PALU), the East African Law
Society (EALS), the Tanganyika Law Society, Zanzibar Law Society, and the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to provide legal representation to
unrepresented Tanzanian death row prisoners. I envision this as a ten-year project.
I chose the project based on its potential for long-term partnerships, the unmet need
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we will address (providing representation for those without lawyers), our ability to
provide unique expertise that is unavailable locally, and the opportunities it presents
for students to engage in direct representation of clients. For the first two years of
the project, we will focus primarily on building relationships with our partners, as
well as with Tanzanian prosecutors, defense attorneys, government officials, and
prison officers. We will also determine the scope of the project by gathering
information on prisoners facing the death penalty, a process that will take years
because those prisoners are dispersed throughout prisons in various regions.
In the representation of each client, we will partner with lawyers from
PALU, EALS, LHRC, or the private criminal defense bar. Together we will
develop an investigation plan and litigation strategy. We will train paralegals on
the mechanics of conducting capital case investigations, including interviewing
skills training. We will train lawyers in essential advocacy skills and international
law regarding the application of the death penalty. And we will work closely with
government lawyers on the eventual implementation of any favorable decisions of
the African Court, beginning long before any decision is issued. It is my hope that
after ten years, we will have succeeded in obtaining favorable judgments from the
African Court for at least a dozen prisoners, and will be able to work with the
Tanzanian government to implement those decisions by removing our clients from
death row—and possibly releasing them. In the course of that work, we hope to be
able to train Tanzanian lawyers to be better advocates for their clients, and help
prison officers, prosecutors and judges understand the relevance of mental health
and mitigation in capital case proceedings. These goals are realistic with a long time
horizon, but would be impossible to achieve over the course of one or two
semesters.
In reflecting on how best to describe my approach to clinical partnerships
in the Global South, I have found Sarah Jackson’s conception of “transformative
solidarity” to be a useful paradigm.211 Jackson explains that some human rights
activists in the Global North view victims of human rights violations as “objects”
of their solidarity, taking campaign actions “for people.”212 She calls this
“charitable solidarity.”213 By contrast, activists that exercise “transformative
solidarity” respect the agency of those whose rights are violated, taking actions
“with [] people, rather than for” them, “to leverage each other’s respective strengths
in addressing interconnected struggles.”214 Transformative solidarity presupposes
a level of understanding and empathy that can only be achieved through deep
engagement over a period of years. As Jackson concludes, “working in a
participatory way that fully respects agency takes more time.”215
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IV. PEDAGOGICAL APPROACHES
Over the years, I have realized that our Malawi work is challenging to
students on multiple levels. Students must navigate significant cultural barriers,
maintain professional standards despite physical discomfort, and accept their
limited ability to effect change in a foreign legal system with severe resource
constraints. My students are often shaken by the poverty they witness in Malawian
villages. They are horrified by the prison conditions. They are frustrated by their
inability to lessen the suffering of their clients. And all of this can contribute to
secondary trauma.
One student described her first interview with a client in Malawi’s Zomba
prison as follows:
It was my first client interview in the prison, and I felt so much weight and
hurt. As I contemplated the day’s experiences that night, I told myself that
hearing sad client stories would probably get easier with time and that it
was just my inexperience that made the process so difficult. But as I
reflected more, I realized that I didn’t want it to get easier. I don’t ever
want to sit with a client and hear a story of injustice and not feel a raw
ache. I think the ability to harness that ache into effective advocacy
probably improves vastly with time. And while I look forward to building
those advocacy skills, I hope I never lose that fresh feeling of shock and
anger about wrongs that I see.216

Another described her feelings of guilt after returning to the United States:
I’ve thought a lot about the men on death row since the trip, especially
those who I feel are truly in there by mistake. There’s a certain guilt that
seems to come with swooping in to take their information down and give
them a bit of hope that someone is working for them and then hopping
back on a plane and coming home to necessarily think of other things, like
finals. While I feel like there must be more good than harm to come from
this, it still nagged at me a bit. We made sure to limit any expectations or
hope by telling the men that we were unsure of what we could do or what
would come out of the interviews but it is hard to believe that they don’t
take some hope from our presence. After all, most receive few visitors at
all, let alone visitors who talk about their case with them. With nothing
but time to think and little else to hold onto, I fear they felt hopeful after
we were there. And now, as the days have passed by, I wonder what they
feel – lingering hope, disappointment, anger?217

I sometimes forget how disturbing it can be for a student to interview
prisoners and witness their suffering. I have been a capital defense lawyer for more
than 25 years, and have been to more prisons than I can count. While I am far from
immune to trauma, I no longer experience the same sense of shock when I speak to
216
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prisoners and hear them recount a litany of humiliations and injustices. As a result,
I gave little thought as a new clinical teacher to my students’ need to process their
feelings. But for the last several years, I try to meet with the students every evening
during the trip to discuss issues that have come up. I do this by means of a “circle
process.”
The circle process draws from Native American traditions, adapted for
contemporary use in a variety of settings, from misdemeanor sentencing
proceedings to therapy groups.218 During the circle process, a “talking piece” is
passed from one participant in the circle to the next. Only the person who holds
the talking piece may speak, while everyone else listens. Talking circles provide
space for students to share personal reflections with the group in a supportive, nonjudgmental setting. The “unhurried pace”219 of the circle encourages even quiet
students to process their reactions to our work at a time when they are still fresh.
While I encourage student reflection and engagement in our death penalty
case work, my students are never primarily responsible for strategic decisions that
affect the lives of their clients. In death penalty cases, it is professionally
indefensible to allow students to make such decisions without significant input and
consultation with their supervisors. Moreover, by assuring students that I have their
back, I relieve them of at least some of the overwhelming dread that often
accompanies capital litigation. This is vital, in my view, to minimize the risk of
secondary trauma.
It must be said, however, that my students miss out on an important learning
opportunity because of my decision to assume ultimate responsibility for strategic
decisions in their cases. In Where in the World is Dr. Detchakandi? A Story of Fact
Investigation,220 a former Georgetown Law School clinic student describes her
agonizing search for a critical witness in her client’s asylum case, and her
frustration at her professor’s refusal to tell her precisely how to find him.221 At the
end of the essay, the student acknowledges that by allowing her to develop her own
strategy (which involved a good deal of fruitless effort before she found her witness
and won the case), her professor allowed her to develop confidence in her own
judgment.222 She concludes that if her professor had acted as her boss, it would
have been helpful to her at the time, but would not have given her the opportunity
to revel in her own creativity and resourcefulness:
If, instead of being a catalyst and a resource, Phil had acted as our boss,
Dan and I would probably still have found Dr. Dekyakandi, and we would
probably have won the case. But what would happen the next time I had
to represent a client, work on a project with someone, or undertake a
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seemingly impossible task?223

While I do give my students leeway to propose a case theory or narrative, and to
conceive of investigative strategies, I would never allow a student to go out in the
field without first reviewing her investigation plan and ensuring she maximizes
opportunities to obtain information necessary for the defense of her client. And that
means taking a more active role in supervision than is typically recommended by
experts on clinical pedagogy.224
CONCLUSION
Over the last twelve years, I have learned much about the nature of northsouth collaboration, the world of development aid, and my clinic’s role in a fraught
political environment. For those interested in developing long-term human rights
projects in a single foreign country with a limited group of partners, I hope that the
Malawi project provides an instructive template. What follows is a short list of the
lessons I’ve learned, with the hope that they will be useful to others contemplating
this approach.
1. There is no substitute for repeated country visits over a long period of
time. Trust develops slowly.
2. During each visit, take time to build relationships with current and
future partners.
3. Be flexible. Your objectives may not align with those of your local
partners.
4. Be open with your local partners about finances. When partners will be
spending a significant amount of time with your team, ask them in
advance to prepare a budget for your review. Understand that you may
need to transfer funds in advance, rather than reimbursing them after
the fact. Do not take for granted their ability to cover any expenses or
provide materials (even copies of documents) without compensation.
5. Bring your own portable printer, toner, and paper if you will need to
print documents.
6. Conceptions of time vary greatly by culture, and influence
expectations of when meetings will begin. If students and supervisors
are not aware of this (and even when they are), delays can lead to
frustration.
7. Be humble. You will make mistakes (repeatedly).
8. If you are a human rights clinician, take no more than 4-5 students at a
time. A larger group is difficult to mobilize quickly and can
overwhelm local partners.
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9. Promote trust among the team members through frequent meetings and
team bonding exercises before the trip.
10. Build in time for reflection with partners and team members
throughout the trip.225
In conclusion, I think it important to recognize the unique nature of every
clinic collaboration. The success of our Malawi project is attributable as much to
the receptiveness and creativity of our partners as it is to the quality of our
advocacy. Whatever knowledge the clinic has imparted pales in comparison to what
they have taught us. As one of my students observed during the first year of the
Malawi project:
While no doubt there are numerous complex factors that explain [our
clinic’s] accomplishments, the conclusion that I drew was that, like any
successful project, these achievements occurred because of a unique
collaborative effort that thrives in the Malawi criminal justice system.
Every person whose case was heard while I was in Malawi had been aided
and supported by Legal Aid, the Department of Public Prosecutions, our
clinic, Penal Reform International, prison guards, police officers,
magistrate and high court judges, and the prisoners themselves. If any
piece of that network had been absent, less would have been accomplished
and some Malawians would still be sitting in an overcrowded prison facing
inappropriate charges. In this way I see the Malawian criminal justice
system as a model for reform in the United States.226
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your students, so that you are rested and ready by the time their flight lands. You will be better
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